As soon as the word "convenient" is used, you know it will affect security.
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Why?
It's not like they're literally using your face or fingerprint as a password. They're not even storing them, just a hash tied to an hsm key.
I can't speak for OP, but in the US, you can be compelled to unlock a phone via fingerprint or face ID. You can't be compelled to give over your PIN. That violates the right against self incriminating.
Totally true. That's not the common threat most people need to guard against however. Additionally, at least on Android, the device is relatively eager to force pin usage if the stars don't align for biometrics
Almost any user are much more likely to encounter a situation where their biometrics are forced and not their password. Passing a border for example.
Biometrics should never be used instead of a password, only as usernames. A password can be changed, your thumbs can't.
Have you ever had your phone searched by the police or at the border? I haven't, but I have had someone try to unlock my phone before.
I'd contend most people have a threat model that puts opportunistic access by household members or someone watching them enter their passcode and then snatching the phone and running above border patrol search.
While you can't change your biometrics, walk me through why that matters. I'm not sharing my biometrics outside of the device, and you can't submit them remotely, so if you lift a print off of something it doesn't really get you much without also taking the phone. Once you're there, you're a bit beyond the typical phone thief in terms of threat.
The most common vulnerability is having an absurdly weak password, pin or unlock pattern. For those people biometrics is a vast improvement specifically because it's both secure against likely threats, and it's just as easy as hitting 5 four times in a row.
Every method has trade offs, and there's nothing to gain by pretending otherwise. Likewise, I don't think I would ever say "never use something", except for some contrived examples.
Almost any user are much more likely to encounter a situation where their biometrics are forced and not their password. Passing a border for example.
That's valid only for americans. And even then: how many of them are crossing country borders regularly?
Which means it's not secure against the authorities but probably is secure against the average thief and or snooping younger sibling/spouse. So, your threat profile and the use of biometrics/vs password may vary.
When I rob you, I hold the phone up to your face to unlock it, then I cut off your finger to use it on your banking and crypto apps to transfer all your money.
/s
I think it depends. Some people might be inclined to use too short or simple password because they don't wanna constantly be typing a long password. It's much better to have a strong password and fingerprint/face rec for convince than just a insecure password.
In the USA, they can legally force you to unlock a device using biometrics.
Also, biometrics can be fooled in other ways.
Yes, but that's besides the point. If the convenient options for a normie user are
- Having a weak password
- Having a strong password and a fingerprint
Out of those the fingerprint with a strong password is way better option, imo.
In the USA, they can legally force you to unlock a device using biometrics.
Also, how does that work? Can't they legally force you to enter your password too? Or can you claim you don't remember it? If that works, can't you just have a band-aid on your finger or something? Surely they cannot force you to take it off and risk getting an infection on the large wound you just happened to get yesterday...?
Also, how does that work? Can’t they legally force you to enter your password too?
No, because forcing someone to enter a password is "compelled speech" and against the 1st Amendment. It's also testimonial, which means compelling that speech would also be self incrimination, which is against the 5th Amendment.
Don't ask me why forcing someone to make a hand gesture is not also compelled speech and not testimonial. The Constitution is mostly nonsense being interpreted by life appointed morons who interpret things however they like.
A normal user will most likely never encounter a situation where their weak password would be at risk, but are much more likely to having their biometrics forced by law enforcement or border control.
They will rip your bandaid off and force your finger or face to scan while holding your device.
Any weak password at all would have been better in a situation like that.
Oh wow, things really have gotten bad over there. For me personally, the much greater risk is that I forget my phone somewhere or someone steals it and in that scenario a weak password is the larger issue.
It seems there isn't a single correct answer here. The threat model is different for everyone.
Any weak password at all would have been better in a situation like that.
How?
'Or' not 'and'. Fingerprint replaces the password for access.
A bandaid would simply be removed. No you can't just say "no". A password is protected though.
Ah just don't go to the USA or don't take a device with information on it there.
Law enforcement can legally trick you into giving up your password, too, and that's full access right there. Having an unlocked phone but no password isn't enough to get into certain parts of the core system/security settings, and trying to get into those will prompt a password anyway (and that generally gatekeeps the access to the phone through a physical connector plugged into the port).
Neither pathway is perfect but I think for real world usage and real world adversaries (not just law enforcement, but also criminal thieves/scammers/hackers, and governmental adversaries that aren't bound by legal limits, like foreign intelligence agencies), it's better to have biometrics so that you are physically punching in your PIN/password much less frequently. Especially on modern systems that get spooked easily and require a password anyway when the phone has been idle too long or when the wrong face looks at it too many times.
The other underappreciated threat model is shoulder surfing, especially in an age of ubiquitous high resolution cameras. Punching in a numerical PIN within view of a camera potentially leaks that secret, and some high resolution cameras can even pick up letters and symbols from the on screen keyboards.
Being compelled to give biometrics doesn't do enough for an adversary (including government adversaries) to do everything with a phone, the way having the password or PIN does, and I would argue that governments would be better at tricking people into inadvertently giving up their PINs and passwords than they'd be at compelling biometrics within the time window that they still work (before the phones lockout biometrics as a valid unlocking method), or being able to do stuff to exploit extraction tools past the lock screen.
So the threat model needs to be understood for what it is.
Cops can't force you to give up your password even if its 12345.
This has big "don't use a standard deadbolt on your front door; it's not as strong as reinforced titanium doors with time-release locks" energy
Like, not technically wrong, but does not fit the standard risk profile, it's overkill for most situations.
Also to everyone talking about US law enforcement, this is just so easy to protect from, not worth ditching biometrics: if you see cops approaching and are worried about a device being unlocked, just reboot it. If you need to do it surreptitiously, just hold the power button to force shut it off after ~10s. This will always require a password to unlock after
Hot take: biometrics are often criticized for being less secure, but that ignores the deficiencies of passwords. Especially on phones, it's very doable to look over someone's shoulder while they're unlocking their phone or do the same with a camera. You can't do that with a fingerprint, at least not nearly as easily.
And yes, I understand that in the US (amongst others?) the legal situations with passwords and biometrics are different, but IMO that's more of a legal question, and not everyone lives in the US.
Android also has an "emergency lockdown" option, which disables biometrics for unlocking your phone - or you can shut it down (worst case scenario force shut down with a long hold on the power button) to get it into a BFU state, which is much harder to crack.
Apple has something similar where you hold the power + volume up for ~3-5 seconds and you get the Power/Emergency call screen but it also disables biometrics until after a successful PIN.
You just press the power button 5 times.
I thought that triggered the actual emergency call itself.
Do you really not use your phones fingerprint reader and type in your passcode every time?
I get that you can be compelled by law enforcement to give up your biometrics, but if you're gonna end up in that sort of situation it's 2 buttons and a tap to temporarily disable biometrics.
Do you really not use your phones fingerprint reader and type in your passcode every time?
Yes, yes I do. I like having friction between me and my addictive distraction rectangle.
Yes, strong password and no biometrics is basic security practice.

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