you are viewing a single comment's thread
view the rest of the comments
[–] 165 points 1 year ago* (18 children)

The sad thing is the concept wasn’t.

Selling NFTs with no physical existence is what is pointlessly stupid.

Before they came along i considered the idea of a blockchain linked video camera where metadata of footage gets written into the chain to combat fake news and misinformation.

The goal would be to create a proof and record of original footage, to which media publishers and people who share can link towards to verify authenticity/author.

If the media later gets manipulated or reframed you would be able to verify this by comparing to the original record.

It was never a finished idea but when i first read nft i thought this is the right direction.

And then capitalism started selling apes and what the actual disgusting money possessed fuck was that.

  • source
  • hideshow 27 child comments
  • [–] 68 points 1 year ago (7 children)

    The certificate/signature part seems okay for verification.

    It's the transferable virtual deeds being sold that are the scam. I could sell you a virtual deed to the Golden Gate Bridge right now, you could buy it but it doesn't really mean anything.

  • source
  • parent
  • hideshow 11 child comments
  • [–] 54 points 1 year ago (1 child)

    Wait just a second! You have a bridge for sale? Tell me more.

  • source
  • parent
  • hideshow 2 child comments
  • [–] 17 points 1 year ago (2 children)

    Well first of all, it allows travel between point A and point B, usually above the ground

  • source
  • parent
  • hideshow 4 child comments
  • [–] 3 points 1 year ago (2 children)

    And time travel! But you have to drive real slow for it to work

  • source
  • parent
  • hideshow 4 child comments
  • [–] 17 points 1 year ago (1 child)

    I could sell you a virtual deed to the Golden Gate Bridge right now, you could buy it but it doesn't really mean anything.

    Yeah, that's possibly the most famous scam in history (people selling deeds to the Brooklyn Bridge), enough to where "I've got a bridge to sell you" is a figure of speech for calling someone gullible or naive.

    And then despite the world knowing about the Brooklyn Bridge scam, the cryptobros actually went and found a bunch of suckers to fall for the exact same scam, only with blockchains instead of notary seals.

  • source
  • parent
  • hideshow 2 child comments
  • load more comments (3 replies)
  • [–] 28 points 1 year ago (10 children)

    Wouldn't a code signing be a simpler way to achieve that? The video camera can produce a hash code with each video and you can always run the same hash function against the video file to confirm that it wasn't tampered with.

  • source
  • parent
  • hideshow 12 child comments
  • [–] 19 points 1 year ago* (1 child)

    I guess the problem NFTs try to solve is authority holding the initial verification tied to the video. If it’s on a blockchain, theoretically no one owns it and the date/metadata is etched in stone, whereas otherwise some entity has to publish the initial hash.

    In other words, one can hash a video, yeah, but how do you know when that hashed video was taken? From where? There has to be some kind of hard-to-dispute initial record (and even then that only works in contexts where the videos earliest date is the proof, so to speak, like recording and event as it happens).

  • source
  • parent
  • hideshow 2 child comments
  • [+] 9 points 1 year ago* (last edited 1 year ago) (1 child)
  • [–] 3 points 1 year ago* (last edited 1 year ago)

    Indeed. The blockchain provides no media hosting, no enforcement, I guess. It can mark something as owned (and require their private key to decrypt or whatever), but ultimately that ownership is as beholden to reality (read: arbitrary purseholders) as any other system. It’s just a record.

  • source
  • parent
  • [–] 2 points 1 year ago (1 child)

    With your scheme you can't prove the timing of when the hash was made, nor who made the hash. At the very least the camera would have to include something that proves the time in the hash, and then sign the result with a private key that can't be extracted from the camera.

  • source
  • parent
  • hideshow 2 child comments
  • load more comments (8 replies)
  • [–] 22 points 1 year ago (7 children)

    This still fundamentally suffers from the oracle problem like all blockchains solutions. You can always attack these blockchain solutions at the point where they need to interact with the real world. In this case the camera is the "oracle" and nothing prevents someone from attacking the proposed camera and leveraging it to certify some modified footage. The blockchain doesn't add anything a public database and digitally signed footage wouldn't also achieve.

  • source
  • parent
  • hideshow 10 child comments
  • [–] 9 points 1 year ago (1 child)

    This is correct.

    This is a flaw i had considered and never found a solution for. Hence the idea is unfinished.

    The only further argument i have is that manipulating camera techniques is as old as film yet it’s the digital tools that are causing the most harm and allow any troll to partake. Staging a scene takes at least some dedication and effort.

    If such would be considered on the blockchain than it would also bring in questions all other footage by the same recorder device. “Wallets” from established authors, anonymous or not would have their own reputations of trustworthyness.

  • source
  • parent
  • hideshow 2 child comments
  • [–] 1 point 1 year ago (1 child)

    This is a very legit concern. But to my understanding, it is possible to make the the camera that's very hard to crack, by putting security enclave or whatever it is that makes phones hard to unlock, right inside the CCD chip. Even if somebody manages to strip off the top layer, chart out the cryptographic circuit, probe the ROM inside, etc and extract the private key, it should be possible upon finding it to revoke the key to that camera or even the entire model and make it even more painful in further models.

    Another concern is of camera being pointed to the screen with a fake image, but I've searched and yet to find a convincing shot that doesn't look like, well, a photo of a screen. But for this concern I think the only counter-measure would be to add photographer and publisher signatures to the mix, so that if anyone is engaging in such practice is caught, their entire library goes untrusted upon revocation. Wouldn't be completely foolproof, but better than nothing, I guess.

  • source
  • parent
  • hideshow 2 child comments
  • [–] 3 points 1 year ago (4 children)

    That's security by obscurity. Given time, an attacker with physical access to the device will get every bit data from it. And yes, you could mark it as compromised, but then there's nothing stopping the attacker from just buying another camera and stripping the key from that, too. Since they already know how. And yes, you could revoke all the keys from the entire model range, and come up with a different puzzle for the next camera, but the attacker will just crack that one too.

    Hiding the key on the camera in such a way that the camera can access it, but nobody else can is impossible. We simply need to accept that a photograph or a video is no longer evidence.

    The idea in your second paragraph is good though, and much easier to implement than your first one.

  • source
  • parent
  • hideshow 4 child comments
  • load more comments (4 replies)
  • load more comments (4 replies)
  • [–] 15 points 1 year ago (1 child)

    This is actually a pretty decent idea considering what's coming now with AI video. I have no idea if it could be implemented, or if media even cares anymore, but I sure would appreciate it.

  • source
  • parent
  • hideshow 2 child comments
  • [–] 8 points 1 year ago (1 child)

    A private key would be built in to the camera. It would be stored in a way that's hard to get at, physically or in software (like the secure enclaves in phones).

    The pics or videos are signed using the private key (again, this process needs to happen in a secure way without revealing the secret key).

    The camera manufacturer publishes the matching public key. Anyone can use it to verify that the file matches the signature. But no one can sign a fake image unless they can get at the private key.

    This would work even if the camera manufacturer no longer existed. The camera does need to ever be online.

    The public/private key pairs are also part of what makes blockchains work, but for this process blockchains would add nothing.

  • source
  • parent
  • hideshow 2 child comments
  • [–] 4 points 1 year ago (1 child)

    still a solution in search of a problem, unfortunately.

    We can still tell when something is AI and it's not at a stage where it can fool mainstream news or the legal system.

  • source
  • parent
  • hideshow 2 child comments
  • [–] 1 point 1 year ago (1 child)

    Did you reply to the wrong comment?

    The problem is “misinformation” and has been since before nft/genai became a thing.

    Gen Ai makes misinformation worse but the event that sparked this was a gop shared video of a democrat which was slightly speed up to seem more aggressive.

    Also simple framing to cut off context from the original has been a very common form of misinformation for decades.

  • source
  • parent
  • hideshow 2 child comments
  • [–] 4 points 1 year ago (3 children)

    to be more clear: block chain for images is a solution in search of a problem because no one is looking for mass-verified images, they are looking for source-verified images, because you can still fake something on the block chain at point of creation. In 2025 the main concern about faked images is with AI, but more sophisticated and more convincing images can be made with older, even analog technology like airbrushing.

    Your example of a sped up Democrat could still be disseminated on the block chain and it would do nothing to confirm or deny its veracity.

  • source
  • parent
  • hideshow 3 child comments
  • load more comments (3 replies)
  • [–] 4 points 1 year ago

    The conceptual issue here is that most attempts at denying the legitimacy of content are not by people who actually operate the given equipment.

    If a celebrity claims some third party footage is fake, that celebrity is not the one that would vouch/not vouch for it. If a paparazzi does something wrong, they'd sign it and say "yes it's authentic".

    Now maybe you can say "Canon genuine" to say it's not the person, but the camera vendor, but again, with the right setup, you can good old analog feed doctored stuff into a legitimate sensor and get that signature.

    Since the anchor for the signature almost never rests with the person who would ever contest the content, it's of limited use.

    Traditional signing is enough to say "If I trust the AP, then I trust this image that the AP signed", no distributed ledger really suggested in this use case, since the trust is entirely around the identity of the originator, not based on consensus.

  • source
  • parent
  • [–] 4 points 1 year ago* (last edited 1 year ago)

    Had thoughts like that before, someone pointed that it already exists and is called C2PA - no blockchain necessary. It's not yet widespread, though.

    As for NFT, when it came out I had thoughts that it could be used for completely transparent and automated businesses. Something like an AirBnB with a digital lock on the front door and you could buy an NFT for a daily stay that you could use to unlock said lock. But then if there's only one company that accepts said NFT's then there's zero reason for it to be on blockchain, they can just send you the code, and if they scam you there's no use for either NFT or the code. There could be real estate ownership certificates, but then again, there would always be only one authority issuing them - zero reason for blockchain. There could be like crowdfunding NFT, but then again, there could only one party managing the funds. There were tons of ideas for practical usage of NFT's, but all of them hinge on there being some party linking the zero-trust crypto and the real world, and if there's only a single trusted party then it always makes more sense for that party to deploy a normal database in place of blockchain and just provide an API endpoint to verify ownership.

    EDIT: Fixed wrong link

  • source
  • parent
  • load more comments (9 replies)