submitted 4 months ago* (last edited 4 months ago) by to c/privacy@lemmy.ml
 

A user created a thread in this lemmy community remarking that the Tor Browser has a personally identifiable fingerprint under normal settings (the "Standard" and "Safer" modes make you fingerprintable), with several commenters doing the same test and reporting the same. The user who created this post also said that on the privacy guides forum posts about this topic are being deleted.

The poster could try to provide proof. Has at least one of these posts been archived (on archive.is or archive.org)?

[–] [S] 1 point 4 months ago*

I'm assuming GrapheneOS isn't backdoored. If a new release were backdoored, I would have a non-zero chance to catch it while reviewing commit diffs, but the chance of catching it would be zero if I instead used auto-update and let the devs push whatever signed binary they wanted.

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  • [–] [S] 6 points 4 months ago* (last edited 4 months ago) (2 children)

    The fact that devs sign the builds doesn't protect you from a Jia Tan type of actor. Jia Tan had social-engineered they way to a maintainer and then dropped their backdoor in the .tar releases. If you had compiled from the tree you couldn't be affected. It's possible to fail to review malicious commits even in this case, but it is still more transparent than pre-packaged releases. And there's no point to reproducible builds if no one actually reproduces them.

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  • submitted 4 months ago* (last edited 4 months ago) by to c/privacy@lemmy.ml
     

    I'm wondering what would be necessary to build GrapheneOS releases yourself, and regularly update your phone from your own servers, with your builds. The server for apps.grapheneos.org should also be replaced. Has anyone done this?

    The documentation for GrapheneOS has a section about how to reproduce builds:

    https://grapheneos.org/build#reproducible-builds

    But it would be more involved than that.

     

    Hello, I've built GenP from source and was able to obtain the dependencies (UPX, AutoIt) from official sources for security reasons. The wintrust DLL is a dependency I could not obtain myself.

    The file needs to be unmodified and original. I've googled the hashes (wintrust.dll - 1b3bf770d4f59ca883391321a21923ae) and could not find mentions of this version. My Windows 11 installation comes with its own version (in System32) but the file size is quite different and it's obviously a much newer version.

    Thanks!

    [–] [S] 1 point 1 year ago* (last edited 1 year ago)

    Netguard also has a separate lockdown mode (which only enables a few apps, or none, to go through) that if toggled automatically based on connected network would enable you to dictate which apps can use untrusted networks.

    While there are lots of apps that automate some sort of action based on the name of the WiFi network, activating the lockdown mode in Netguard is more specific, and I doubted if it's even possible. To start, I came up with a Termux command invocation that toggles the lockdown mode in Netguard. After customizing the quick settings (near the notification area) this adb command confirms that this method for toggling Netguard's lockdown mode really works:

    adb shell cmd statusbar click-tile eu.faircode.netguard/.WidgetLockdown
    

    Default Termux doesn't request the necessary permission which impeded the command from running, however:

    java.lang.SecurityException: StatusBarManagerService: Neither user 10472 nor current process has android.permission.EXPAND_STATUS_BAR.
    

    So this is where I'm at, I could probably just use Tasker to like some people do to run the cmd statusbar command, but I also wanted to call some attention to the issue report on the Termux repository regarding this permission.

    EDIT: There's a high likelyhood it won't work on Tasker without root, and on termux it also wouldn't work even if you managed to request the permission.

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  • [–] [S] 1 point 1 year ago

    For the record, in almost all versions of Android you can install apps in a isolated environment through Shelter. Apps in this environment get icons in your home screen just like the rest, but don't share the vpn/firewall connection that you might have active through RethinkDNS, among other things.

    You effectively have two sets of apps with different firewall settings. And if you figure out a way to automate the locking down of RethinkDNS (through something like Tasker or Schröder's Automation,) you would effectively have a mechanism that only lets the small number of apps in the isolated environment work while connected to an untrusted network.

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  • submitted 1 year ago* (last edited 1 year ago) by to c/privacy@lemmy.ml
     

    Does the school you go to need to know that you have the Signal app installed on your phone, checking with the Signal servers in the background for new messages? Even if you chose to use a VPN to tunnel your traffic entirely, is there no other option but for your employer to witness you connected to a foreign VPN server? If you connected to a point at your home, even that could be interpreted that you have something hide.

    You could have two phones with different sets of apps in your pocket (one for “business” and one for everything else), but you if you don’t want that you have to ask:

    Is there a firewall for Android that can block your usual traffic from leaving the device, by turning on a specific profile based on something like the Wi-Fi name? There are quite a few traffic blockers, such as RethinkDNS, Netguard, or personalDNSfilter, but they assume you want to block the same set of traffic regardless of time and place.

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