YOU MIGHT think that in Trumpworld a new National Security Strategy (NSS) would not count for all that much. John Bolton, a national security adviser in Donald Trump’s first term, frequently laments that his boss had no strategy at all. Instead, the president worked by impulse—and without the encumbrance of too many briefings. From one day to the next, he veered in opposing directions.
Despite that, the new NSS matters. Released, weirdly, in the dead of night on December 4th/5th, it will be pored over by soldiers, diplomats and advisers in America and around the world. It is the latest and fullest statement of what “America First” means in foreign policy. It sets the terms for a soon-expected review of military power, and lays out the priorities for all those trying to interpret the president’s wishes. And, for many of its readers, it will be profoundly alarming.
For the most part, the new NSS rejects the decades-old insight that a common set of values are what cement America’s alliances. It declares that it is “not grounded in traditional, political ideology” but is motivated by “what works for America”. Instead, it embraces what it calls “flexible realism”. That means being “pragmatic without being ‘pragmatist’, realistic without being ‘realist’, principled without being ‘idealistic’, muscular without being ‘hawkish’, and restrained without being ‘dovish’.”
If that sounds like a dog’s breakfast, that is because it is. Shorn of the enlightened values that have long anchored foreign policy, America First becomes a naked assertion of power that owes more to the 19th century than the world that America built after the second world war. And that leads to a document riven by contradictions.
In some parts of the world, in particular in Asia, Mr Trump expects countries to behave as willing allies. In most others they are to submit meekly to America’s economic and military will. In one place the NSS rejects the interventionist idea of urging countries to adopt “democratic or other social change that differs widely from their traditions and histories”. That suits Russia, China and the monarchies of the Middle East. Yet in Europe, where MAGA worries about wokeism, migration and the dominance of liberal values, the NSS bluntly declares that “our goal should be to help Europe correct its current trajectory.”
When the NSS applies this formula to the world, region by region, the full consequences of this shift start to become clear.
Nowhere is this more evident than in the section covering the western hemisphere. “We want to ensure that the western hemisphere remains reasonably stable and well-governed enough to prevent and discourage mass migration to the United States,” it reads. Governments in the Americas will be enlisted to control migration and curb drug flows. They are expected to grant America control of key assets, resources and strategic locations, or at least a veto over “hostile foreign” ownership of them—a clear warning to refuse Chinese investments that offer a sway over ports or such assets as the Panama Canal. Where law enforcement has failed to halt drug smuggling, America will use armed forces, the NSS warns.
This swaggering right of intervention is called a “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine. That is a deliberate tribute to the “Roosevelt Corollary”, President Theodore Roosevelt’s assertion of gendarme-like enforcement rights over the western hemisphere in 1904.
All this seems sure to provoke angry recollections of high-handed American interventions in the region in the 20th century, from military invasions and blockades to CIA-backed coups or security pacts that saw America arming and training autocracies guilty of extra-judicial murders and torture in the cold war. With its talk of conditioning aid and trade on co-operation from Latin American governments, the NSS signals a belief that resentment will not stop Latin Americans from doing as they are told.
In Asia, by contrast, allies will read the NSS with a mixture of immediate relief and long-term gloom. The passages on Taiwan could have been worse. The nightmare scenario for such allies as Japan, the Philippines and South Korea would have involved an NSS declaring that the fate of the democratically ruled island of Taiwan is not an existential interest for America.
Instead, the NSS restates America’s position that it “does not support any unilateral change to the status quo in the Taiwan Strait”. True, there is nothing about Taiwan’s importance as a friendly, pro-Western democracy whose people overwhelmingly oppose coming under rule by China. But the strategy does make a cold-eyed realist case for Taiwan’s importance as a usefully-located redoubt in the middle of the “First Island Chain” that runs from Japan through Taiwan to the Philippines, penning in China’s navies and air forces. In addition, the NSS nods to Taiwan’s importance as the largest source of advanced semiconductors.
Accordingly, America will sustain forces capable of deterring any attempt to take Taiwan or to control the sea lanes near that island, or in the South China Sea. Asian allies must also spend much more on their own defences and grant America more access to their ports and bases. In short, the NSS demands that Asian countries risk China’s wrath by helping America contain Chinese ambitions in the Indo-Pacific. But there is not a word of criticism for China’s (or indeed Russia’s) expansionist ambitions or their desire to overthrow the post-1945 legal and multilateral order.
The NSS spares its sharpest barbs for Europe. The old world, it says, is undergoing a profound crisis, and this is not so much about economic decline or military weakness as it is about the loss of national identity, leading to the “stark prospect of civilisational erasure”.
Warning that “it is more than plausible that within a few decades at the latest, certain NATO members will become majority non-European,” the NSS warns that “it is an open question whether they will view their place in the world, or their alliance with the United States, in the same way as those who signed the NATO charter.” In other words, immigrants will corrupt the values of the societies they move to—a shocking assertion from a country that is itself built on immigration.
The NSS’s prescriptions for Europe flow from this assertion of Judeo-Christian nationalism. The NSS calls for “unapologetic celebrations of European nations’ individual character and history”, encouraging the revival promoted by “patriotic European parties”. That is a reference to the populist right, including National Rally in France, Reform UK in Britain and Alternative for Germany, which the vice-president, J.D. Vance, embraced earlier this year when he spoke at a conference in Munich. If that is the Trump administration’s programme, how are the centrist governments in Europe, who see these parties as a grave threat, supposed to treat America as an ally?
When the NSS applies this rationale to Ukraine, it draws some devastating conclusions. Suggesting that most Europeans want peace even if it means surrendering to Vladimir Putin, and asserting that their governments are standing in the way, the strategy calls for a rapid end to the war in order to prevent escalation. It says that America should curb the sense in Europe that Russia is a threat and warns that NATO cannot be “a perpetually expanding alliance”. Alarmingly, it has nothing to say about the repeated aggression and hostility of Vladimir Putin, the Russian president. To much of Europe, this sort of appeasement will only serve to set up the next conflict.
“In everything we do, we are putting America First,” reads the letter from Mr Trump to the American people that opens the NSS. But it is the preceding sentence that will be read by allies with gloom, and with glee by China and Russia, for it is hopelessly at odds with reality: “America is strong and respected again—and because of that, we are making peace all over the world.” Alas, that claim comes from an administration that is indeed feared, resented and obsessed over, but one that is less respected or trusted than any American government in decades.
