I havent yet made any claim that Apple is sending your data to Google.
Apple acknowledges these issues per their Private Cloud Compute newsroom release:
Cloud AI security and privacy guarantees are difficult to verify and enforce. If a cloud AI service states that it does not log certain user data, there is generally no way for security researchers to verify this promise — and often no way for the service provider to durably enforce it. For example, a new version of the AI service may introduce additional routine logging that inadvertently logs sensitive user data without any way for a researcher to detect this. Similarly, a perimeter load balancer that terminates TLS may end up logging thousands of user requests wholesale during a troubleshooting session.
It’s difficult to provide runtime transparency for AI in the cloud. Cloud AI services are opaque: providers do not typically specify details of the software stack they are using to run their services, and those details are often considered proprietary. Even if a cloud AI service relied only on open source software, which is inspectable by security researchers, there is no widely deployed way for a user device (or browser) to confirm that the service it’s connecting to is running an unmodified version of the software that it purports to run, or to detect that the software running on the service has changed.
It’s challenging for cloud AI environments to enforce strong limits to privileged access. Cloud AI services are complex and expensive to run at scale, and their runtime performance and other operational metrics are constantly monitored and investigated by site reliability engineers and other administrative staff at the cloud service provider. During outages and other severe incidents, these administrators can generally make use of highly privileged access to the service, such as via SSH and equivalent remote shell interfaces. Though access controls for these privileged, break-glass interfaces may be well-designed, it’s exceptionally difficult to place enforceable limits on them while they’re in active use. For example, a service administrator who is trying to back up data from a live server during an outage could inadvertently copy sensitive user data in the process. More perniciously, criminals such as ransomware operators routinely strive to compromise service administrator credentials precisely to take advantage of privileged access interfaces and make away with user data.
We are still waiting for a full write-up on how Private Cloud Compute can protect against this, but I'm sure Apple will release more information as we get closer to September.
