Nice just look at the most worn buttons

Ironkey has been more careful than some other vendors but the concept still seems dubious to me, if you are trying to stop serious attackers. You want the decryption key to be completely separated from the storage.

Do encryption in software. History taught us hard lessons about this.

I had one of the SanDisk flash drives that had some launcher thing on it and I had a password for some reason on it.

In high school, a classmate tried to guess it, 3 times and I lost everything on it forever, since it stupidly locked forever after 3 tries.

I had software projects from back then that I can never get back.. including a web browser. I could have had the next Firefox..

If you're out there, Liz: I'll never forgive that.

Hardware signing devices have lots of utility because they keep the key from ever being on the machine (which is more likely to be compomised). Think ledger or trezor for your Bitcoin. Hardware encryption devices are just really expensive and black-box ways to avoid Veracrypt.

If your encryption algorithm is secure, you have no use for automatic lock-out. If it's not, automatic lockout won't do much against an attacker with physical access to the device. Unless they are dumb enough to trigger the lockout AND the internal memory wipes itself sufficiently well AND/OR the attacker doesn't have the resources to reverse engineer the device.

The IronKey has been cracked

Yeah i dont see how this would be better then a run of the mill thumb drive (that doesnt scream im worth stealing) and just creating a cryptomator vault on it.

Obligatory XKCD

They occupy a strange niche full of contradictions.

Entering the code on the device itself should increase security as opposed to entering it on a compromised computer.

But plugging it into a compromised computer means the data is compromised anyway.

Their security is way harder to audit than a software solution like PGP. The actual "encryption" varies from actual decent setups to "entering the code connects the data pins with no actual encryption on the storage chip"

Not having to instal/use software to use them means they are suitable for non-technical users which in turn means more support calls for "I forgot the pin, it wiped itself, can you restore my data"

They are kind of useful to check the "data is transported on encrypted media" box for compliance reasons without having to manage something bigger.

These are handy if you have to move sensitive information but I've experienced more than one event at work where irreplaceable files were lost due to user error on these type of drives.

I couldn't tell you about the lifespan of these devices either, something tells me the keys won't last more than a few years if it's being used regularly.

Looks find to me, depending on your use case, everything would have a use case

Many people mention airport red flags and checks, for me I never had any issues with the airport stuff, except one time in China when I had a full case of wires, really 10kg of wires, and they just asked me me to open and show, np

I wouldn't trust any part of its hardware and software to store anything worth encrypting on it

The ones that went through FIPS 140-2 Type 3 or above validation are legit. We used Apricorn for CUI data…examples: https://www.archives.gov/cui/registry/category-list

I don't trust hardware implementations of encryption in the same way I don't trust hardware raid arrays.

Too expensive. Use software encryption instead

like everyone else has said hardware level encryption doesn’t seem like the most sound option.

Personally i’ve just encrypted sensitive files with picocrypt, only just started looking into better encryption techniques though so there’s probably better alternatives.

Good until you spill a Cuppasoup on it's chinesium keyboard.

Same problems as any firmware based encryption (encrypting SSDs, etc.). Firmware is quickly outdated and the triangle price - speed - security usually neglects the security part.

First time I've seen something like that, but my initial thought was: wow, that's a lot of parts that can break and things that can go wrong (compared to only encrypting the data itself before storage).

As long as the security software it uses is solid I think it's a decent idea.

Stopping low effort attempts to get data it seems good, as an addition too software encryption it seems great. Of course hardware can range from child toys, gimmicks, to serious hardened hardware, so results WILL vary.