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Unlike the more common postinstall-hook supply-chain pattern, this campaign executes at module-load (import/require) time. When any consuming build or application imports a poisoned package, the injected block runs immediately. Because the trigger is an import rather than an install script, the common npm install –ignore-scripts mitigation does not neutralize it.

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After loading a project, Cursor attempts to find git binaries at various locations including the current workspace. By creating a repository with a planted malicious git.exe in the root, the IDE will execute it with no user interaction and no prompting of the user. This occurs repeatedly on a cadence.

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SymJack is a new attack technique targeting AI coding agents: a booby-trapped repository to trick your AI coding assistant into overwriting its own configuration through a disguised file copy, then run attacker code on the next restart. This is one technique that works against the whole category, don’t treat it as six separate bugs.

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My personal conclusion can however not end up with anything else than that the big hype around this model so far was primarily marketing. I see no evidence that this setup finds issues to any particular higher or more advanced degree than the other tools have done before Mythos. Maybe this model is a little bit better, but even if it is, it is not better to a degree that seems to make a significant dent in code analyzing.

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At Machine Speed (matthiasott.com)
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A minimal Node.js wrapper around ClamAV that scans any file and returns a typed Verdict Symbol:

  • Verdict.Clean
  • Verdict.Malicious
  • Verdict.ScanError

Zero runtime dependencies. No daemon. No cloud. No native bindings. Works locally via clamscan or remotely via clamd TCP socket (Docker-friendly).

npm install pompelmi

Repo: https://github.com/pompelmi/pompelmi Issues, PRs, and stars all welcome — it's how open source stays alive.

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Anthropic presents Mythos and Project Glasswing as evidence that advanced AI vulnerability research should be restricted. But our replication suggests a different conclusion: the capabilities Anthropic points to are already available in public models, so defenders should prepare for that reality instead.

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The AI Security Institute (AISI) conducted evaluations of Anthropic’s Claude Mythos Preview (announced on 7th April) to assess its cybersecurity capabilities. Our results show that Mythos Preview represents a step up over previous frontier models in a landscape where cyber performance was already rapidly improving.

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