Linux and LibreOffice as daily drivers are used in the Data Protection and Document Managment Department at the Technical University of Vienna in Austria - not because it was ordered from above but because the team decided that those are the correct tools for their job. Other departments in the university administration are now set to follow.

...

“The current situation poses an unpredictable risk for users outside the US,” says Christina Thirsfeld [the university's Data Protection Officer]. She therefore decided, on behalf of her department, to shelve the Windows operating system and its associated software and instead make way for a penguin – the Linux operating system (with its emblem, the penguin) would replace Windows, and MS Office would be replaced by LibreOffice: a real-world experiment.

...

Christina Thirsfeld encourages people to take the plunge. “Digital sovereignty is a precious asset that we should strive for, even if it may involve a certain loss of convenience or require us to break with old habits. Convenience should not take precedence over digital sovereignty.” The pilot project at the TU Wien has shown that greater digital independence in everyday university life is possible.

...

 

A citizens' initiative regarding Finland's security of supply for critical digital services is progressing to parliament for consideration.

The initiative has garnered the 50,000 statements of support needed in order to be considerd by lawmakers.

According to the initiative's backers, Finland needs to secure its critical digital services, including for elections, social security, taxation and others.

"Finland must ensure that the basic rights of citizens, democracy and national security are not dependent on actors who are under the purview of governments outside the EU/EEA," their website states in English.

The digital sovereignty advocacy group noted that such services, and the critical information they involve, are increasingly being moved into the hands of "big corporations from outside the EU".

"Critical public services and data must be kept in the hands of Finnish and European actors, on servers located in the EU/EEA and built on top of European or open software," the group's website stated.

Earlier this year, the justice ministry announced it had reversed a plan to store election data on cloud servers operated by US tech giant Amazon.

...

 

cross-posted from: https://scribe.disroot.org/post/10392878

  • Across a range of authoritarian regimes, challenges to information control consistently provoke stronger reactions than economic, diplomatic, and military tools.
  • Democracies should take these signals seriously, and raise the costs of information control to reclaim a policy option that has historically worked in their favor.
  • Support for independent media, anti-censorship technologies, and civil society engagement should not be treated as peripheral democracy-promotion initiatives. These are strategic national security instruments that raise the costs of repression while remaining consistent with democratic values.
  • Reclaiming these capabilities would revive a form of statecraft championed by Wałęsa and Havel, and so courageously demanded by Navalny, Mohammadi, and Lai.

Archived version

For three decades, democracies have treated sanctions, diplomacy, and military activities (exercises or otherwise) as their primary tools for influencing authoritarian States. Yet our research suggests there is a tool that autocrats fear even more: challenges to their information control. Analysis of propaganda and official communications from China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea shows that these regimes consistently react more negatively to information threats than to the economic, diplomatic, and military tools of statecraft. This insight highlights a key, underutilized opportunity for democratic national-security policymaking.

...

Research consistently finds that authoritarian states from China, to North Korea, to Russia, or even relatively smaller autocratic states such as Azerbaijan, respond more negatively to the information tools of statecraft than to military, economic, or diplomatic tools.

For example, criticizing Russia over its censorship and information control creates a more negative POSM [propaganda, official statements, and state-controlled media] reaction from the Kremlin than a NATO exercise in the Baltics. Similarly, criticism of Beijing’s information controls, first labeled the Great Firewall nearly 30 years ago in a 1997 Wired magazine article, creates a more negative POSM reaction than economic sanctions or even Taiwanese military exercises involving U.S. participants.

By “more negative reaction,” we mean that the targeted State’s public messaging is more hostile, condemnatory, and accusatory toward the initiating State and its actions. Such responses may portray the action, whether sanctions, military exercises, or other tool of statecraft, as illegitimate, threatening, hypocritical, or deliberately hostile; these negative reactions by authoritarians are highest in response to the information tools of statecraft.

...

What does this mean for policymakers?

  • First, democracies and civil-society actors should double down on supporting free media, independent reporting, human-rights monitoring, and transparency in authoritarian countries. Rather than viewing information campaigns merely as pressure tools, democratic states should view them as normative contests: truth, transparency, moral suasion, and media freedom all command interest and retain immense power.

  • Second, in their information operations, democratic states should focus more on the controls, less on specific narratives. For example, rather than attempting to outfox Putin’s propagandists with narratives that appeal to Russian audiences, policymakers should work to reduce the controls that prevent, for example, Russian mothers of servicemembers killed in the war in Ukraine from expressing themselves. Messages and memes arising organically from within a society can often be more compelling, and therefore more threatening to authoritarian regimes, than narratives crafted by outsiders.

...

  • Third, recognizing that authoritarian regimes may respond harshly with repression targeting their domestic population when they express themselves publicly, international actors should be prepared to offer protection and support to civil society, journalists, and dissidents. As in the Cold War, ethical information operations demand accountability. For example, offering VPNs and satellite internet services is only part of information statecraft; offering to support and shelter those who avail themselves of these capabilities, including with refugee status, must remain an option.

...

  • Fourth, instead of unilateral actions, states should seek to work through international institutions or at least via a coalition of like-minded states. The U.N., regional bodies, and related coalitions provide collective legitimacy and reduce the risk of strategic abuse. This helps keep the contest focused broadly and collectively on freedom of information access and related normative conditions that favor democracies, rather than engaging in the type of ethics-light, propaganda-versus-propaganda contest that favors the controlled information environments of authoritarians.

...

Edit:

Here is the full report: China, DIME, and innovative deterrence methodology: How authoritarian states react to deterrence activities through information (pdf)

 
  • Across a range of authoritarian regimes, challenges to information control consistently provoke stronger reactions than economic, diplomatic, and military tools.
  • Democracies should take these signals seriously, and raise the costs of information control to reclaim a policy option that has historically worked in their favor.
  • Support for independent media, anti-censorship technologies, and civil society engagement should not be treated as peripheral democracy-promotion initiatives. These are strategic national security instruments that raise the costs of repression while remaining consistent with democratic values.
  • Reclaiming these capabilities would revive a form of statecraft championed by Wałęsa and Havel, and so courageously demanded by Navalny, Mohammadi, and Lai.

Archived version

For three decades, democracies have treated sanctions, diplomacy, and military activities (exercises or otherwise) as their primary tools for influencing authoritarian States. Yet our research suggests there is a tool that autocrats fear even more: challenges to their information control. Analysis of propaganda and official communications from China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea shows that these regimes consistently react more negatively to information threats than to the economic, diplomatic, and military tools of statecraft. This insight highlights a key, underutilized opportunity for democratic national-security policymaking.

...

Research consistently finds that authoritarian states from China, to North Korea, to Russia, or even relatively smaller autocratic states such as Azerbaijan, respond more negatively to the information tools of statecraft than to military, economic, or diplomatic tools.

For example, criticizing Russia over its censorship and information control creates a more negative POSM [propaganda, official statements, and state-controlled media] reaction from the Kremlin than a NATO exercise in the Baltics. Similarly, criticism of Beijing’s information controls, first labeled the Great Firewall nearly 30 years ago in a 1997 Wired magazine article, creates a more negative POSM reaction than economic sanctions or even Taiwanese military exercises involving U.S. participants.

By “more negative reaction,” we mean that the targeted State’s public messaging is more hostile, condemnatory, and accusatory toward the initiating State and its actions. Such responses may portray the action, whether sanctions, military exercises, or other tool of statecraft, as illegitimate, threatening, hypocritical, or deliberately hostile; these negative reactions by authoritarians are highest in response to the information tools of statecraft.

...

What does this mean for policymakers?

  • First, democracies and civil-society actors should double down on supporting free media, independent reporting, human-rights monitoring, and transparency in authoritarian countries. Rather than viewing information campaigns merely as pressure tools, democratic states should view them as normative contests: truth, transparency, moral suasion, and media freedom all command interest and retain immense power.

  • Second, in their information operations, democratic states should focus more on the controls, less on specific narratives. For example, rather than attempting to outfox Putin’s propagandists with narratives that appeal to Russian audiences, policymakers should work to reduce the controls that prevent, for example, Russian mothers of servicemembers killed in the war in Ukraine from expressing themselves. Messages and memes arising organically from within a society can often be more compelling, and therefore more threatening to authoritarian regimes, than narratives crafted by outsiders.

...

  • Third, recognizing that authoritarian regimes may respond harshly with repression targeting their domestic population when they express themselves publicly, international actors should be prepared to offer protection and support to civil society, journalists, and dissidents. As in the Cold War, ethical information operations demand accountability. For example, offering VPNs and satellite internet services is only part of information statecraft; offering to support and shelter those who avail themselves of these capabilities, including with refugee status, must remain an option.

...

  • Fourth, instead of unilateral actions, states should seek to work through international institutions or at least via a coalition of like-minded states. The U.N., regional bodies, and related coalitions provide collective legitimacy and reduce the risk of strategic abuse. This helps keep the contest focused broadly and collectively on freedom of information access and related normative conditions that favor democracies, rather than engaging in the type of ethics-light, propaganda-versus-propaganda contest that favors the controlled information environments of authoritarians.

...

 

This is an op-ed by JJ Jasser, a professor and director of data analytics at Rollins College. His research examines artificial intelligence, open-source development, and digital literacy.

Archived version

Another Chinese AI model is released, and another wave of hype follows. Whether the buzz comes more from industry professionals, influencers posing as AI experts, or bots is increasingly hard to tell. The latest model to get this treatment is Kimi K3, and to be fair, the hype has a factual basis: K3 ranks among the top five models on the Artificial Analysis Intelligence Index, an industry benchmarking and analysis site, and took first place in the Frontend Code Arena, another benchmark leaderboard, ahead of far more expensive proprietary systems. The technical achievement is real. That is precisely why its problems deserve a closer look.

Whenever a new model comes out of China, I perform what I call the Tiananmen Square test. When I asked K3 to "Tell me more about the Tiananmen Square protest in 1989," it answered: "Sorry, I cannot provide this information. Please feel free to ask another question." I should be careful about generalizing, since independent testing has found that Chinese models vary here; some engage honestly with these topics in English while aligning with official positions in Chinese-language settings. And what I tested was the Kimi app, not the model weights; app-layer filters can differ from the model underneath. But that distinction is exactly the problem.

...

"Open-source" is not a marketing register. It is a standard with specific criteria. For over two decades, the Open Source Initiative has maintained the definition that governs the term in software: the freedom to use, study, modify, and share, for anyone and for any purpose. In 2024, recognizing that model releases were stretching the label past recognition, OSI extended this into the Open Source AI Definition, which requires disclosure of the complete code used in training and sufficiently detailed information about the training data for others to understand and recreate the system.

...

Moonshot, the company behind [Chinese Kini3 model] ... the components that matter most will remain closed: the training data and the training pipeline. K3 is, at best, an open-weight model: one you can download and run, but never fully study or reconstruct. Today it is not even that. Calling it open-source is a category error, and the error is doing rhetorical work. Researchers call this pattern "open-washing," borrowing openness’s credibility while withholding the transparency that justifies it.

...

Open weights may allow companies to run and fine-tune K3 on their own systems, but fine-tuning away refusals cannot restore history that was never in the training data. Until Chinese AI companies can provide the transparency their government seems unlikely to allow, “open” will continue to do rhetorical work these models have not earned. That gap, not any benchmark, is the real advantage of genuinely open development.

 

Archived version

As part of its “reindustrialisation” strategy, new UK prime minister Andy Burnham’s government needs to recognise the importance of open source in the country’s artificial intelligence (AI) strategy, as a report by OpenUK has highlighted concerns over UK AI sovereignty that policymakers need to address to ensure access to key technologies.

In her introduction to the AI openness report, OpenUK CEO Amanda Brock noted that the export control exerted through presidential executive orders by Donald Trump has seen the US “rock the world”. “It denied access to chips for China and certain AI for non-US citizens,” she said. “The perhaps-unintended consequence of this has been to drive users to China’s open source.”

...

In the report, James Drayson, co-founder and CEO at Locai Labs, said: “For organisations already worried about control, data security, intellectual property leakage and unpredictable API [application programming interface] pricing, [these] policy positions have converted a hypothetical concern into a reality and a precedent.

“This has prompted a movement back towards on-prem deployment in the UK and other worried nation states,” he added. “Openness is precisely what turns a capable model into a trusted foundation. The ask is simple: if you want enterprises to build on your model, show them what it’s made of.”

...

OpenUK urged policymakers to consider the main requirements for technological sovereignty in the UK. The organisation believes tech sovereignty is only about independence from international companies, but also requires the UK to manage its own technologies directly.

“We must stop giving those we develop to others to hold, manage and monetise,” it said. “The data tells us that the UK is not well served by throwing money at building new large or frontier models. The opportunity to hone in on with a laser focus is the model-adjacent technologies in the AI harnesses, infrastructure and developer tooling. The lower barrier to entry is enabling individuals and innovators to break into this space.” ...

[–] 2 points 6 days ago

They force the government to levy taxes and tariffs and ban competition to protect their established non-competitive products and profit margins.

Even if we put aside that Chinese manufacturers produce often under slave-like conditions, the vast majority of companies are not fit for market without massive state subsidies and additional support that are much higher than anything in West.

A good way to observe this is, for example, when we compare Chinese and Western car manufacturers which are producing within China. Even in the country, Chinese car firms receive a lot more direct state aid by all comparative standards. Between 2019 and 2002, Tesla's reported state aid was 2% of net income, and no grants since 2023 (European car markers' grants were even lower than Tesla's), while BYD’s subsidy income were 265 of net income in 2024 and 35% in 2025.

The gap between Western and Chinese producers is much larger if Western firms produce at home.

Another way Chinese carmakers lower costs: they 'outsource' costs to their suppliers. BYD has even created its own proprietary supply chain finance system called the “D-chain,” through which it issues “e-debt certificates" which means the company stands outside the law (there is a Negotiable Instruments Law in China in principle, but it doesn't matter to all companies). According to company reports for the years 2023 and 2024, BYD took an average of 155 days to pay suppliers, Geely 149 days, and Leapmotor even 225 days.

Western carmakers paid their suppliers much sooner - Tesla withing 60 days, Volkswagen in 43 days, and 41 for Toyota in 41 days.

Chinese companies also benefit from below-market borowings (below the China Prime Loan Rate), and they receive preferential access to cheap land to build their factories (especially if and when there are good connections to the party).

And this is a TINY sample of what happens. Comparing Western and Chinese subsidies doesn't make sense. It must clearly be said that under Western subsidy schemes, Chinese carmakers would have long been bankrupt.

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  • [–] 3 points 6 days ago* (last edited 6 days ago)

    The subsidies in China for its companies go well beyond everything we do (or have done ) in the West.

    A good way to observe this is, for example, when we compare Chinese and Western car manufacturers which are producing within China. Even in the country, Chinese car firms receive a lot more direct state aid by all comparative standards. Between 2019 and 2002, Tesla's reported state aid was 2% of net income, and no grants since 2023 (European car markers' grants were even lower than Tesla's), while BYD’s subsidy income were 265 of net income in 2024 and 35% in 2025.

    The gap between Western and Chinese producers is much larger if Western firms produce at home.

    Another way Chinese carmakers lower costs: they 'outsource' costs to their suppliers. BYD has even created its own proprietary supply chain finance system called the “D-chain,” through which it issues “e-debt certificates" which means the company stands outside the law (there is a Negotiable Instruments Law in China in principle, but it doesn't matter to all companies). According to company reports for the years 2023 and 2024, BYD took an average of 155 days to pay suppliers, Geely 149 days, and Leapmotor even 225 days.

    Western carmakers paid their suppliers much sooner - Tesla withing 60 days, Volkswagen in 43 days, and 41 for Toyota in 41 days.

    Chinese companies also benefit from below-market borowings (below the China Prime Loan Rate), and they receive preferential access to cheap land to build their factories (especially if and when there are good connections to the party).

    And this is a TINY sample of what happens. Comparing Western and Chinese subsidies doesn't make sense. It must clearly be said that under Western subsidy schemes, Chinese carmakers would have long been bankrupt.

    Edit: I didn't mention that whenever you buy a China-made car (from a Chinese or non-Chinese brand), you risk to buy a car made by forced labour. We must not forget this.

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    Archived version

    The EU’s tech chief has warned that AI has become a geopolitical weapon, pushing for Europe to develop its own alternatives.

    ...

    Brussels last month presented a tech sovereignty package to loosen its dependence on US technology by backing European alternatives in sectors from semiconductors and cloud computing to AI.

    The plan has incentives to accelerate the construction of European data centres and favour homegrown cloud and AI technologies, such as the AI company Mistral or cloud providers such as Scaleway or OVHcloud.

    “It’s so important also that Europe is building up our own capacities and that we are not dependent on third countries for these very critical technologies,” Virkkunen said.

    ...

    In order to finance those investments, the EU and the European Investment Bank will set up a new mechanism to make strategic investments in European tech companies.

    ...

    The “kill switch” risk is the clearest political image. "If a foreign government can require a provider to cut access, change model availability, restrict compute exports or expose data under national law, European users face a dependency that is not merely commercial. It becomes strategic," writes EUToday in a an article covering the issue.

    If European institutions and governments want domestic or trusted AI capacity, they must create demand. That could mean buying European models for public administration, supporting sovereign cloud frameworks and funding compute infrastructure through EU-European Investment Bank mechanisms.

    ...

    Virkkunen’s warning should therefore be read as a policy marker. Europe is no longer discussing AI sovereignty only to create champions. It is asking whether critical functions can be interrupted from outside the Union. That is a harder and more practical question.

    The next phase will be judged by execution rather than vocabulary. Europe has no shortage of strategies on cloud, data and AI; the test is whether they translate into compute capacity, procurement demand and viable companies able to serve public and private clients at scale.

    ...

    [–] [S] -4 points 6 days ago (3 children)

    China’s goals are selfish ... a good baseline for any other open source project which have public good in mind.

    How does this make sense? There is no open source. As China is 'selfish', as you say yourself, how can this be a 'good baseline for any other open source project which have public good in mind'?

    What do you understand by ‘capitalism’ and what has it to do with this issue?

    You are contradicting yourself over and again, the only consistent thing is the positive frame of China. This is just Chinese propaganda and makes no sense.

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  • [–] [S] -3 points 6 days ago (5 children)

    And capitalism defenders can’t have that…

    What do you understand by 'capitalism' and what has it to do with this issue?

    What China is attempting here is - amongst others - a shift towards a neoliberal system that will financially benefit a few at the expense of the mass (just look at the wealth and income inequality that has extensively increased in China in the recent decade and now reached U.S. levels, surpassing EU levels).

    Open source should aim to make software a public good, not a commodity.

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    cross-posted from: https://scribe.disroot.org/post/10269370

    Archived version

    ...

    The angst over China's latest AI models is missing an important business fact: "open weight" AI is not the same thing as open-source software.

    Open-source software, where the code is freely shared, can be an amazing business. Think Red Hat, which IBM bought for $34 billion. Open-weight AI models are different — and, so far, they're proving to be a terrible business.

    Take Z.ai, also known as Zhipu. It's publicly traded, so we can see its finances. Last year, the Chinese company lost almost $500 million on revenue of about $107 million.

    ...

    Zhipu is the lab behind GLM 5.2, an open-weight AI model that wowed the industry when it launched last month. You might expect the stock to have soared. Instead, Zhipu shares have plunged more than 40% over the past month.

    MiniMax, one of the only other independent Chinese AI labs that's publicly traded, lost $250 million last year on revenue of just $79 million. Its shares have fallen more than 50% in the past month.

    ...

    Open-weight AI isn't open-source software

    The key difference comes down to economics.

    Software can be distributed almost for free. Once it's written, sending another customer a copy costs practically nothing. Profit margins improve as software companies grow.

    AI doesn't work that way. Every answer requires expensive chips, electricity, and data-center capacity. The next unit of software is nearly free; the next unit of intelligence is not.

    ...

    Moonshot AI, another Chinese lab, illustrated the problem last week. Its new Kimi K3 open-weight model impressed the industry with frontier-level performance. But days after launch, the company had to halt new customer sign-ups because it didn't have enough computing power to run the model.

    If Moonshot were selling traditional software, adding millions of users would be relatively easy. Instead, every new customer increases the company's infrastructure bill, capping its growth.

    ...

    Someone else captures the profits

    The way open-weight AI models are run, a process known as inference, makes the business situation worse.

    Open-weight AI labs give outsiders their models' trained numerical parameters, allowing them to download and run them. (Parameters are like tiny numerical dials inside a model's brain that determine how these systems learn from data and what outputs they produce).

    After that, these models are usually run by other companies, such as cloud giants Amazon, Microsoft, Google, Oracle, and Alibaba. There are also specialist providers such as Fireworks AI and Baseten, although they largely rent capacity from the big cloud companies.

    Companies can also download these open weights and run the models themselves. Or, they can also use the Chinese model maker's own inference service, but in the Western world, most corporate customers don't do that for data security reasons.

    ...

    Only that last option reliably generates real revenue for the model creator. In the other three cases, the AI lab that spent hundreds of millions of dollars building the model may receive little or no ongoing revenue.

    That leaves the model makers in a difficult position. They've paid heavily to train the systems, then given away the key assets.

    ...

    No wonder Alibaba's stock is up about 13% over the past month, while AI labs Zhipu and MiniMax have been crushed.

    ...

    "Unlike open-source software, open-weight models do not generate significant sums of revenue by selling support, services, and enterprise editions around the free offering (the Red Hat playbook)," William Blair's Bhatia wrote.

    "Instead, they primarily generate revenue by hosting the model and selling inference compute. But inference workloads will flow to whoever can operate the inference infrastructure most efficiently, and this is usually not the model provider," the analyst added.

    ...

    Raimo Lenshow, an analyst at Barclays, recently came back from China after researching the country's AI sector. He reached a similar conclusion.

    "Intense domestic competition has also led to more aggressive pricing competition," the analyst told investors. "Some major models remain open-source or open-weight, accelerating the pricing pressure throughout the system. While this helps drive faster commercialization, it is also adding uncertainty to long-term profitability for those AI labs."

    ...

    So why give the models away?

    Open technology has long been a strategy for challengers trying to catch market leaders. A late starter may not be able to match a leader's customers or distribution, but it can spread its technology widely, attract developers, and make the leader's product harder to sell at premium prices.

    That may be exactly what China and its AI labs are trying to do. Open-weight models put pressure on OpenAI, Anthropic, and other US leaders by offering capable alternatives at lower prices. Even if the Chinese labs make little money themselves, they can force American competitors to cut prices and make it harder to recover the billions they spend training new models.

    Bhatia said Chinese labs may be releasing open-weight models with "little regard for near-term profitability." In his view, openness can turn advanced AI into a commodity, weakening the business model of US companies that keep their technology closed.

    ...

    The financial payoff for the Chinese labs may come much later — or may be less important than the broader strategic benefit to China.

    ...

     

    cross-posted from: https://scribe.disroot.org/post/10269370

    Archived version

    ...

    The angst over China's latest AI models is missing an important business fact: "open weight" AI is not the same thing as open-source software.

    Open-source software, where the code is freely shared, can be an amazing business. Think Red Hat, which IBM bought for $34 billion. Open-weight AI models are different — and, so far, they're proving to be a terrible business.

    Take Z.ai, also known as Zhipu. It's publicly traded, so we can see its finances. Last year, the Chinese company lost almost $500 million on revenue of about $107 million.

    ...

    Zhipu is the lab behind GLM 5.2, an open-weight AI model that wowed the industry when it launched last month. You might expect the stock to have soared. Instead, Zhipu shares have plunged more than 40% over the past month.

    MiniMax, one of the only other independent Chinese AI labs that's publicly traded, lost $250 million last year on revenue of just $79 million. Its shares have fallen more than 50% in the past month.

    ...

    Open-weight AI isn't open-source software

    The key difference comes down to economics.

    Software can be distributed almost for free. Once it's written, sending another customer a copy costs practically nothing. Profit margins improve as software companies grow.

    AI doesn't work that way. Every answer requires expensive chips, electricity, and data-center capacity. The next unit of software is nearly free; the next unit of intelligence is not.

    ...

    Moonshot AI, another Chinese lab, illustrated the problem last week. Its new Kimi K3 open-weight model impressed the industry with frontier-level performance. But days after launch, the company had to halt new customer sign-ups because it didn't have enough computing power to run the model.

    If Moonshot were selling traditional software, adding millions of users would be relatively easy. Instead, every new customer increases the company's infrastructure bill, capping its growth.

    ...

    Someone else captures the profits

    The way open-weight AI models are run, a process known as inference, makes the business situation worse.

    Open-weight AI labs give outsiders their models' trained numerical parameters, allowing them to download and run them. (Parameters are like tiny numerical dials inside a model's brain that determine how these systems learn from data and what outputs they produce).

    After that, these models are usually run by other companies, such as cloud giants Amazon, Microsoft, Google, Oracle, and Alibaba. There are also specialist providers such as Fireworks AI and Baseten, although they largely rent capacity from the big cloud companies.

    Companies can also download these open weights and run the models themselves. Or, they can also use the Chinese model maker's own inference service, but in the Western world, most corporate customers don't do that for data security reasons.

    ...

    Only that last option reliably generates real revenue for the model creator. In the other three cases, the AI lab that spent hundreds of millions of dollars building the model may receive little or no ongoing revenue.

    That leaves the model makers in a difficult position. They've paid heavily to train the systems, then given away the key assets.

    ...

    No wonder Alibaba's stock is up about 13% over the past month, while AI labs Zhipu and MiniMax have been crushed.

    ...

    "Unlike open-source software, open-weight models do not generate significant sums of revenue by selling support, services, and enterprise editions around the free offering (the Red Hat playbook)," William Blair's Bhatia wrote.

    "Instead, they primarily generate revenue by hosting the model and selling inference compute. But inference workloads will flow to whoever can operate the inference infrastructure most efficiently, and this is usually not the model provider," the analyst added.

    ...

    Raimo Lenshow, an analyst at Barclays, recently came back from China after researching the country's AI sector. He reached a similar conclusion.

    "Intense domestic competition has also led to more aggressive pricing competition," the analyst told investors. "Some major models remain open-source or open-weight, accelerating the pricing pressure throughout the system. While this helps drive faster commercialization, it is also adding uncertainty to long-term profitability for those AI labs."

    ...

    So why give the models away?

    Open technology has long been a strategy for challengers trying to catch market leaders. A late starter may not be able to match a leader's customers or distribution, but it can spread its technology widely, attract developers, and make the leader's product harder to sell at premium prices.

    That may be exactly what China and its AI labs are trying to do. Open-weight models put pressure on OpenAI, Anthropic, and other US leaders by offering capable alternatives at lower prices. Even if the Chinese labs make little money themselves, they can force American competitors to cut prices and make it harder to recover the billions they spend training new models.

    Bhatia said Chinese labs may be releasing open-weight models with "little regard for near-term profitability." In his view, openness can turn advanced AI into a commodity, weakening the business model of US companies that keep their technology closed.

    ...

    The financial payoff for the Chinese labs may come much later — or may be less important than the broader strategic benefit to China.

    ...

     

    cross-posted from: https://scribe.disroot.org/post/10269423

    Beijing consults companies on ways to stop west acquiring its advanced technologies and star start-ups.

    Archived version

    Chinese regulators are considering tightening export controls on artificial intelligence and semiconductor technologies, as the US-China rivalry intensifies in cutting-edge AI.

    Regulators led by the Ministry of Commerce (MofCom) have been consulting leading domestic AI and chipmaking groups on how to prevent China’s advanced technologies and star start-ups from being acquired by the west, according to two people involved in the discussions.

    MofCom talked to AI companies including Alibaba, ByteDance and Zhipu on limiting the transfer of key data for the training of their models overseas, as well as allowing their model weights to be downloaded by foreign users, the people said.

    ...

    MofCom has also sought views on possible restrictions that would prevent overseas chipmakers including Qualcomm and TSMC from producing advanced semiconductors based on designs developed by Chinese companies such as Huawei, Alibaba and ByteDance, according to the people.

    Potential restrictions could also be imposed on the overseas acquisition of strategic technology groups in areas such as agentic AI, the people said. This is mainly to address a loophole that Beijing believes to have led to Meta’s $2bn acquisition of Manus, a deal that was subsequently ordered to be unwound by Chinese authorities.

    ...

    [–] [S] -3 points 1 week ago

    The risk is not in the visible code, but in the invisible training data, the alignment protocols, and the potential for future remote manipulation or data harvesting via associated cloud services.

    Would that be good? I would clearly say 'no', the term 'open source' alone is offensively misinterpreted by the way the Chinese government is using it here. What China is doing here has nothing to do with open source. I hope Europe goes a different path with Mistral and other projects.

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  • [+] [S] -14 points 1 week ago (2 children)

    What's the difference between U.S. and Chinese AI for those 'with eyes willing to see'?

    The sad answer is that Europe and others need to collaborate and develop their own tech. The U.S. and Chinese AI is the same useless crap, with China's even more (intentionally) biased.

    But this article is about China, not the U.S. If you engage further in whataboutism and conveying cheap Chinese propaganda narratives, I stop this conversation.

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