cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/56695126

Archived

[...]

The recent prosecutions [of independent book sellers in Hong Kong] show that the boundary of acceptable behavior has shifted once again. The book store Have a Nice Stay had already announced its closure before the raid took place, citing “uncertain red lines.” When it becomes arguably impossible to adapt, a decade-old model of cultural resistance begins to fade away, with consequences for what remains of Hong Kong civil society.

For the authorities, there are benefits to maintaining what one could term strategic ambiguity. However, one might argue that even the national security police themselves do not know what or where the “red lines” are. Communities, civic spaces, and speech in Hong Kong will come under increasing examination as the government uses and ever-finer comb to find supposed threats. With the obvious targets out of the way, the range of what will be allowed seems set to shrink still further. Meanwhile, the police, whose budget has ballooned in the past years, need to justify their existence even as there is less and less to scrutinize.

[...]

The censure of independent bookstores – together with the assemblage of other measures taken to advance one sense of Hong Kong society, identity, history, and culture – are part of a larger campaign to re-align Hong Kong’s “hearts and souls.” The governments of Hong Kong and China appear determined to give only one option to Hong Kongers: to remember their “Chinese heart” and fall in line in a new society under the auspices of national security, where the only way forward is the one offered by the government.

[...]

Here is the full report: How the CCP Outsources Surveillance (pdf)

[...]

The effectiveness of China’s online censorship springs not from the party-state’s bureaucratic capacity but from its ability to coopt market forces. What began as the rumored “fifty-cent army” of idle posters has grown into a profit-making industry worth hundreds of millions of dollars a year, as Chinese Communist Party [CCP]committees and government agencies outsource digital surveillance and opinion management to private firms.

These companies detect “sensitive” words, flood platforms with propaganda, and suppress troublesome posts with a technical precision the state lacks on its own—letting some discussion continue while stopping the rest, and heading off “online mass incidents” before they spill into the streets. The arrangement, the author concludes, does not bode well for dissent: Surveillance is becoming more precise and preemptive, and so long as businesses find it profitable to collaborate, society will struggle to find a counterweight to market-enhanced digital repression.

[...]

The reach and prowess of the CCP regime are amply recognized; what is less recognized are the other forces (whether profit-making arms of the state or private firms) that the state mobilizes to penetrate society—online and offline—and shape desirable social behavior.

Judging by the size of the industry that has sprung up, the outsourcing of digital surveillance has been a success. Communism’s ideological sway may be waning, but market incentives remain effective. The party-state can no longer turn out neighborhood elders to persuade communities to follow CCP edicts, but there is money to be made in online-opinion control because the party-state values it and will pay for it.

The outsourcing of digital monitoring does not bode well for dissent in China. Online surveillance is becoming more precise and better at preemption. Outbreaks of social dissent against the CCP regime are being stopped before they can start. If one does happen, as in the white-paper protests, the regime has the precision capabilities (thanks to out-sourcing) to respond to it without needing to choke the entire internet.

So long as businesses are willing to collaborate with the state, it will be hard for society to find a counterweight against market-enhanced digital repression.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/56694775

Here is the full report: How the CCP Outsources Surveillance (pdf)

[...]

The effectiveness of China’s online censorship springs not from the party-state’s bureaucratic capacity but from its ability to coopt market forces. What began as the rumored “fifty-cent army” of idle posters has grown into a profit-making industry worth hundreds of millions of dollars a year, as Chinese Communist Party [CCP]committees and government agencies outsource digital surveillance and opinion management to private firms.

These companies detect “sensitive” words, flood platforms with propaganda, and suppress troublesome posts with a technical precision the state lacks on its own—letting some discussion continue while stopping the rest, and heading off “online mass incidents” before they spill into the streets. The arrangement, the author concludes, does not bode well for dissent: Surveillance is becoming more precise and preemptive, and so long as businesses find it profitable to collaborate, society will struggle to find a counterweight to market-enhanced digital repression.

[...]

The reach and prowess of the CCP regime are amply recognized; what is less recognized are the other forces (whether profit-making arms of the state or private firms) that the state mobilizes to penetrate society—online and offline—and shape desirable social behavior.

Judging by the size of the industry that has sprung up, the outsourcing of digital surveillance has been a success. Communism’s ideological sway may be waning, but market incentives remain effective. The party-state can no longer turn out neighborhood elders to persuade communities to follow CCP edicts, but there is money to be made in online-opinion control because the party-state values it and will pay for it.

The outsourcing of digital monitoring does not bode well for dissent in China. Online surveillance is becoming more precise and better at preemption. Outbreaks of social dissent against the CCP regime are being stopped before they can start. If one does happen, as in the white-paper protests, the regime has the precision capabilities (thanks to out-sourcing) to respond to it without needing to choke the entire internet.

So long as businesses are willing to collaborate with the state, it will be hard for society to find a counterweight against market-enhanced digital repression.

[...]

Archived

[...]

The recent prosecutions [of independent book sellers in Hong Kong] show that the boundary of acceptable behavior has shifted once again. The book store Have a Nice Stay had already announced its closure before the raid took place, citing “uncertain red lines.” When it becomes arguably impossible to adapt, a decade-old model of cultural resistance begins to fade away, with consequences for what remains of Hong Kong civil society.

For the authorities, there are benefits to maintaining what one could term strategic ambiguity. However, one might argue that even the national security police themselves do not know what or where the “red lines” are. Communities, civic spaces, and speech in Hong Kong will come under increasing examination as the government uses and ever-finer comb to find supposed threats. With the obvious targets out of the way, the range of what will be allowed seems set to shrink still further. Meanwhile, the police, whose budget has ballooned in the past years, need to justify their existence even as there is less and less to scrutinize.

[...]

The censure of independent bookstores – together with the assemblage of other measures taken to advance one sense of Hong Kong society, identity, history, and culture – are part of a larger campaign to re-align Hong Kong’s “hearts and souls.” The governments of Hong Kong and China appear determined to give only one option to Hong Kongers: to remember their “Chinese heart” and fall in line in a new society under the auspices of national security, where the only way forward is the one offered by the government.

[...]

Here is the full report: How the CCP Outsources Surveillance (pdf)

[...]

The effectiveness of China’s online censorship springs not from the party-state’s bureaucratic capacity but from its ability to coopt market forces. What began as the rumored “fifty-cent army” of idle posters has grown into a profit-making industry worth hundreds of millions of dollars a year, as Chinese Communist Party [CCP]committees and government agencies outsource digital surveillance and opinion management to private firms.

These companies detect “sensitive” words, flood platforms with propaganda, and suppress troublesome posts with a technical precision the state lacks on its own—letting some discussion continue while stopping the rest, and heading off “online mass incidents” before they spill into the streets. The arrangement, the author concludes, does not bode well for dissent: Surveillance is becoming more precise and preemptive, and so long as businesses find it profitable to collaborate, society will struggle to find a counterweight to market-enhanced digital repression.

[...]

The reach and prowess of the CCP regime are amply recognized; what is less recognized are the other forces (whether profit-making arms of the state or private firms) that the state mobilizes to penetrate society—online and offline—and shape desirable social behavior.

Judging by the size of the industry that has sprung up, the outsourcing of digital surveillance has been a success. Communism’s ideological sway may be waning, but market incentives remain effective. The party-state can no longer turn out neighborhood elders to persuade communities to follow CCP edicts, but there is money to be made in online-opinion control because the party-state values it and will pay for it.

The outsourcing of digital monitoring does not bode well for dissent in China. Online surveillance is becoming more precise and better at preemption. Outbreaks of social dissent against the CCP regime are being stopped before they can start. If one does happen, as in the white-paper protests, the regime has the precision capabilities (thanks to out-sourcing) to respond to it without needing to choke the entire internet.

So long as businesses are willing to collaborate with the state, it will be hard for society to find a counterweight against market-enhanced digital repression.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/56554213

Cases of Cruelty Galvanize Country’s Young People.

Archived

In late June, videos of four boys cruelly mistreating and burning a dog and her puppies in Jieyang, Guangdong province, circulated widely online. Public outrage was swift and overwhelming: paid billboards and other advertisements appeared in over 100 cities across the country called for an end to animal abuse. More than 70,000 people signed an online petitiondemanding accountability and a national animal protection law.

Animal protection supporters abroad crowdfunded a billboard in Hong Kong’s Mong Kok district and purchased screen advertisements in Taipei and New York’s Times Square.

On June 30, the government, while acknowledging that the abuse occurred and explaining the consequences for those responsible, also urged "netizens not to spread related information."

Suppression followed. Social media platforms removed posts about “Wang Wang,” a generic and endearing term supporters used for the puppies’ mother. The Chinese social media site Weibo also reportedly blocked a celebrity’s statement and a related trending topic. Online, people have reported that police ordered memorial advertisements taken down from public screens in several cities. An organizer told the BBC that police had questioned and threatened dozens of others, telling them to stop their activism.

[...]

The Jieyang response follows a pattern. Earlier in June, police in the municipality of Chongqing forcibly dispersed hundreds of residents who had gathered for days to protest another reported case of dog abuse. They injured several people and briefly took dozens away before detaining—under public pressure—the alleged abuser.

Animal abuse has clearly touched a nerve in China, especially among young people for whom pets have become an important source of companionship. Peaceful expressions of public outrage should never be considered a threat to state security. Chinese authorities should stop suppressing public discussion of animal abuse, free any protesters still detained, and investigate police violence in Chongqing. They should also listen to what people are saying, whether it’s about personal freedom, the rights of the public, or the protection of Wang Wangs.

[...]

Cases of Cruelty Galvanize Country’s Young People.

Archived

In late June, videos of four boys cruelly mistreating and burning a dog and her puppies in Jieyang, Guangdong province, circulated widely online. Public outrage was swift and overwhelming: paid billboards and other advertisements appeared in over 100 cities across the country called for an end to animal abuse. More than 70,000 people signed an online petitiondemanding accountability and a national animal protection law.

Animal protection supporters abroad crowdfunded a billboard in Hong Kong’s Mong Kok district and purchased screen advertisements in Taipei and New York’s Times Square.

On June 30, the government, while acknowledging that the abuse occurred and explaining the consequences for those responsible, also urged "netizens not to spread related information."

Suppression followed. Social media platforms removed posts about “Wang Wang,” a generic and endearing term supporters used for the puppies’ mother. The Chinese social media site Weibo also reportedly blocked a celebrity’s statement and a related trending topic. Online, people have reported that police ordered memorial advertisements taken down from public screens in several cities. An organizer told the BBC that police had questioned and threatened dozens of others, telling them to stop their activism.

[...]

The Jieyang response follows a pattern. Earlier in June, police in the municipality of Chongqing forcibly dispersed hundreds of residents who had gathered for days to protest another reported case of dog abuse. They injured several people and briefly took dozens away before detaining—under public pressure—the alleged abuser.

Animal abuse has clearly touched a nerve in China, especially among young people for whom pets have become an important source of companionship. Peaceful expressions of public outrage should never be considered a threat to state security. Chinese authorities should stop suppressing public discussion of animal abuse, free any protesters still detained, and investigate police violence in Chongqing. They should also listen to what people are saying, whether it’s about personal freedom, the rights of the public, or the protection of Wang Wangs.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/56554213

Cases of Cruelty Galvanize Country’s Young People.

Archived

In late June, videos of four boys cruelly mistreating and burning a dog and her puppies in Jieyang, Guangdong province, circulated widely online. Public outrage was swift and overwhelming: paid billboards and other advertisements appeared in over 100 cities across the country called for an end to animal abuse. More than 70,000 people signed an online petitiondemanding accountability and a national animal protection law.

Animal protection supporters abroad crowdfunded a billboard in Hong Kong’s Mong Kok district and purchased screen advertisements in Taipei and New York’s Times Square.

On June 30, the government, while acknowledging that the abuse occurred and explaining the consequences for those responsible, also urged "netizens not to spread related information."

Suppression followed. Social media platforms removed posts about “Wang Wang,” a generic and endearing term supporters used for the puppies’ mother. The Chinese social media site Weibo also reportedly blocked a celebrity’s statement and a related trending topic. Online, people have reported that police ordered memorial advertisements taken down from public screens in several cities. An organizer told the BBC that police had questioned and threatened dozens of others, telling them to stop their activism.

[...]

The Jieyang response follows a pattern. Earlier in June, police in the municipality of Chongqing forcibly dispersed hundreds of residents who had gathered for days to protest another reported case of dog abuse. They injured several people and briefly took dozens away before detaining—under public pressure—the alleged abuser.

Animal abuse has clearly touched a nerve in China, especially among young people for whom pets have become an important source of companionship. Peaceful expressions of public outrage should never be considered a threat to state security. Chinese authorities should stop suppressing public discussion of animal abuse, free any protesters still detained, and investigate police violence in Chongqing. They should also listen to what people are saying, whether it’s about personal freedom, the rights of the public, or the protection of Wang Wangs.

[...]

Cases of Cruelty Galvanize Country’s Young People.

Archived

In late June, videos of four boys cruelly mistreating and burning a dog and her puppies in Jieyang, Guangdong province, circulated widely online. Public outrage was swift and overwhelming: paid billboards and other advertisements appeared in over 100 cities across the country called for an end to animal abuse. More than 70,000 people signed an online petitiondemanding accountability and a national animal protection law.

Animal protection supporters abroad crowdfunded a billboard in Hong Kong’s Mong Kok district and purchased screen advertisements in Taipei and New York’s Times Square.

On June 30, the government, while acknowledging that the abuse occurred and explaining the consequences for those responsible, also urged "netizens not to spread related information."

Suppression followed. Social media platforms removed posts about “Wang Wang,” a generic and endearing term supporters used for the puppies’ mother. The Chinese social media site Weibo also reportedly blocked a celebrity’s statement and a related trending topic. Online, people have reported that police ordered memorial advertisements taken down from public screens in several cities. An organizer told the BBC that police had questioned and threatened dozens of others, telling them to stop their activism.

[...]

The Jieyang response follows a pattern. Earlier in June, police in the municipality of Chongqing forcibly dispersed hundreds of residents who had gathered for days to protest another reported case of dog abuse. They injured several people and briefly took dozens away before detaining—under public pressure—the alleged abuser.

Animal abuse has clearly touched a nerve in China, especially among young people for whom pets have become an important source of companionship. Peaceful expressions of public outrage should never be considered a threat to state security. Chinese authorities should stop suppressing public discussion of animal abuse, free any protesters still detained, and investigate police violence in Chongqing. They should also listen to what people are saying, whether it’s about personal freedom, the rights of the public, or the protection of Wang Wangs.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/56505579

Here is the report in Polish (pdf) and the report in English (pdf).

How does TikTok show China to Polish users?

Experts from the Polish NASK Disinformation Analysis Centre examined nearly 10,000 pieces of material on six topics considered particularly sensitive by Beijing (Xinjiang, Tibet, Tiananmen Square massacre, Taiwan, human rights, re-education camps). They show that the way content is recommended may be conducive to building a favourable image of China.

Some key points:

• Many of the materials classified as „pro-China” based on the adopted criteria contained statements fully consistent with messages approved by the Publicity Department and other bodies directly subordinate to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

• There are at least several English-language accounts on the Tiktok app responsible for spreading pro-Chinese propaganda messages. A few characteristics indicate their direct links to the Chinese propaganda mechanism, including they exclusively discuss topics important to Chinese propaganda message, promote an extremely pro-Chinese message, attempt to discredit individuals criticizing the CCP’s actions, and publish large amounts of professionally prepared content despite posing as, for example, ordinary tourists in China.

• The Tiktok app does not designate state-owned channels as “state-controlled media as Facebook does. This means that it is impossible to determine which channels on the platform operate directly under government control.

• The examined material raises legitimate doubts about the impartiality of the TikTok app. It is impossible to definitively answer the question whether this is solely the result of the algorithm itself or the presence of a significant number of propaganda channels on the platform, whose activities are not moderated or labeled in any way.

• This raises doubts, especially considering the platform’s subordination to a Chinese entity (ByteDance) operating within the Chinese legal system. Therefore, the app has significant potential to become a tool for shaping audience attitudes and views in the event of large scale influence operations.

• Given the scale of Sino-Russian cooperation in information exchange, the TikTok app may pose a potential threat to the security of Polish users. Therefore, it is recommended not only to approach content appearing on the platform critically, but also to refrain from publishing sensitive data on the platform – this is particularly relevant for government entities and individuals associated with the state apparatus.

[...]

The analysis showed that the way content was presented on TikTok differed significantly depending on the topic. The highest percentage of pro-Chinese content was recorded for Xinjiang (58.7%) and Tibet (44.5%). This also applied to the issue of human rights in China (35%).

In turn, the results that referred to the Tiananmen Square massacre were dominated by content critical of the Chinese authorities (76.6%). "We treat such actions as a so-called "safety valve" – a strategy to create the impression of freedom of speech," the analysts write.

In the case of Taiwan, neutral materials predominated (92%). The most unusual results were obtained for the topic of re-education camps – as much as 89% of the displayed materials were not related to the searched topic. "The conclusions of the study clearly show that TikTok uses different content selection strategies for different topics.

"However, we should not focus solely on the operation of one algorithm. This is a question about who shapes the image of the world that millions of users see every day, and how they do it," says Antoni Mazek, an analyst at the NASK Disinformation Analysis Centre and co-author of the report.

[...]

In the flood of information, it is easier to give up further searches In the case of the topic concerning re-education camps, OAD analysts observed a large number of random videos. Unrelated content accounted for as much as 89%. In response to this specific query, several dozen materials appeared praising miraculous methods for weight loss (34% of content on the topic of health/weight loss), and even recordings of Chinese women doing the hula hoop.

"This is intended to discourage users from further searches – explains Dr Agnieszka Lipińska, head of OAD. "It simply causes frustration in the recipient. The search for information on an important topic collides with content that is less intellectually engaging," she adds.

Western influencers reinforce manipulation The analysed content rarely took the form of official messages. It often took the form of travel advertisements or lifestyle content. There was also material featuring Western influencers who constructed their narratives according to a similar pattern: they presented themselves as people "discovering the truth" about China and criticised Western media coverage. It was their materials that were most often recommended to Polish users. Prolonged exposure to such content may affect the perception of China by the audience, according to the researchers.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/56505692

Archived

The European Union's latest anti-dumping tariffs on Chinese-made tires are poised to accelerate a strategic realignment across Korea's tire industry, prompting local manufacturers to curb their production reliance on China as geopolitical risks increasingly reshape global supply chains.

Under the latest regulatory measure, Hankook Tire received an anti-dumping duty of 4.3 percent, while Kumho Tire and Nexen Tire were each hit with a 24.4 percent levy. The effective tariff burden rises to 8.8 percent for Hankook and 28.9 percent for its domestic rivals, after calculating the EU’s existing 4.5 percent import tariff.

The disparity reflects years of divergent manufacturing strategies rather than differences in product competitiveness.

[...]

The tariff decision is widely viewed as a catalyst for broader restructuring across the Korean tire industry, with manufacturers increasingly shifting production closer to major end markets in Europe and North America, as geopolitical uncertainties surrounding China continue to mount.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/56505579

Here is the report in Polish (pdf) and the report in English (pdf).

How does TikTok show China to Polish users?

Experts from the Polish NASK Disinformation Analysis Centre examined nearly 10,000 pieces of material on six topics considered particularly sensitive by Beijing (Xinjiang, Tibet, Tiananmen Square massacre, Taiwan, human rights, re-education camps). They show that the way content is recommended may be conducive to building a favourable image of China.

Some key points:

• Many of the materials classified as „pro-China” based on the adopted criteria contained statements fully consistent with messages approved by the Publicity Department and other bodies directly subordinate to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

• There are at least several English-language accounts on the Tiktok app responsible for spreading pro-Chinese propaganda messages. A few characteristics indicate their direct links to the Chinese propaganda mechanism, including they exclusively discuss topics important to Chinese propaganda message, promote an extremely pro-Chinese message, attempt to discredit individuals criticizing the CCP’s actions, and publish large amounts of professionally prepared content despite posing as, for example, ordinary tourists in China.

• The Tiktok app does not designate state-owned channels as “state-controlled media as Facebook does. This means that it is impossible to determine which channels on the platform operate directly under government control.

• The examined material raises legitimate doubts about the impartiality of the TikTok app. It is impossible to definitively answer the question whether this is solely the result of the algorithm itself or the presence of a significant number of propaganda channels on the platform, whose activities are not moderated or labeled in any way.

• This raises doubts, especially considering the platform’s subordination to a Chinese entity (ByteDance) operating within the Chinese legal system. Therefore, the app has significant potential to become a tool for shaping audience attitudes and views in the event of large scale influence operations.

• Given the scale of Sino-Russian cooperation in information exchange, the TikTok app may pose a potential threat to the security of Polish users. Therefore, it is recommended not only to approach content appearing on the platform critically, but also to refrain from publishing sensitive data on the platform – this is particularly relevant for government entities and individuals associated with the state apparatus.

[...]

The analysis showed that the way content was presented on TikTok differed significantly depending on the topic. The highest percentage of pro-Chinese content was recorded for Xinjiang (58.7%) and Tibet (44.5%). This also applied to the issue of human rights in China (35%).

In turn, the results that referred to the Tiananmen Square massacre were dominated by content critical of the Chinese authorities (76.6%). "We treat such actions as a so-called "safety valve" – a strategy to create the impression of freedom of speech," the analysts write.

In the case of Taiwan, neutral materials predominated (92%). The most unusual results were obtained for the topic of re-education camps – as much as 89% of the displayed materials were not related to the searched topic. "The conclusions of the study clearly show that TikTok uses different content selection strategies for different topics.

"However, we should not focus solely on the operation of one algorithm. This is a question about who shapes the image of the world that millions of users see every day, and how they do it," says Antoni Mazek, an analyst at the NASK Disinformation Analysis Centre and co-author of the report.

[...]

In the flood of information, it is easier to give up further searches In the case of the topic concerning re-education camps, OAD analysts observed a large number of random videos. Unrelated content accounted for as much as 89%. In response to this specific query, several dozen materials appeared praising miraculous methods for weight loss (34% of content on the topic of health/weight loss), and even recordings of Chinese women doing the hula hoop.

"This is intended to discourage users from further searches – explains Dr Agnieszka Lipińska, head of OAD. "It simply causes frustration in the recipient. The search for information on an important topic collides with content that is less intellectually engaging," she adds.

Western influencers reinforce manipulation The analysed content rarely took the form of official messages. It often took the form of travel advertisements or lifestyle content. There was also material featuring Western influencers who constructed their narratives according to a similar pattern: they presented themselves as people "discovering the truth" about China and criticised Western media coverage. It was their materials that were most often recommended to Polish users. Prolonged exposure to such content may affect the perception of China by the audience, according to the researchers.

[...]