Almost every program that we run has access to the environment, so nothing stops them from curling our credentials to some nefarious server.

Why don't we put credentials in files and then pass them to the programs that need them? Maybe coupled with some mechanism that prevents executables from reading any random file except those approved.

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[–] 70 points 3 years ago (2 children)

Environments are per-process. Every program can have its own environment, so don't inject secrets where they're not needed.

I'm using bubblewrap to restrict access to FS.

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  • [–] 21 points 3 years ago* (1 child)

    The environment of other processes is readable in procfs.

    /proc/PID/environ

    Thanks to the permissions it's read-only, and only by the user with which the process runs, but it's still bad, I think

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  • [–] 7 points 3 years ago (2 children)

    Don't all programs run as the user anyways? That changes nothing on a single user machine

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  • [–] 15 points 3 years ago (1 child)

    A proper server should have one user per service.

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  • [–] 0 points 3 years ago (2 children)
  • [–] 3 points 3 years ago (2 children)

    You don't login as service users, they're just a means of taking advantage of the user separation features. They have the login shell set to /bin/false typically.

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  • [–] 2 points 3 years ago (1 child)
  • [–] 3 points 3 years ago

    From a quick search I've just done, the major difference is that /bin/false can't return any text, the only thing it can do as specified via POSIX standards is return false.

    So if you set someone's shell to /bin/nologin there can be some text that says "You're not allowed shell access", similar to what happens if you try to SSH into say GitHub.

    Of course, for a service account that won't be operated by a person, that doesn't matter - so whichever one you use is just whichever the operator thought of first, most likely.

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  • [–] 33 points 3 years ago (2 children)

    I have a rule that credentials in environment variables are to only ever be loaded as needed via some sort of secrets manager, optionally adding a wrapper script to do so transparently.

    The whole point of passing secrets as environment variables is to avoid having things in files in plain and in known locations easy to scrape up by any malware.

    Now we have people going full circle and slapping those into a .env file.

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  • [–] 3 points 3 years ago (2 children)

    But how do you authenticate to your secret manager? How do you prevent evil scripts from also doing this?

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  • [–] 2 points 3 years ago (1 child)

    I'd be very thankful for an example of your setup. I'm using Bitwardern for browser-related password management, but for convenience scripts I load the credentials as env vars at login through .bash_profile 😅

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  • [–] 26 points 3 years ago (1 child)

    No no see the credentials have been towed outside the environment.

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  • [+] 23 points 3 years ago* (last edited 2 years ago)
    [–] 22 points 3 years ago

    The classic Unix user and permission system provides a solution for this.

    Create a user for the app you are worried about. Make the environment variables available to that user only.

    Other apps can’t read the secrets, and if the app itself gets exploited, it has access to the secrets in any case.

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  • [–] 11 points 3 years ago

    I suppose in a well configured Docker or Kubernetes environment this doesn't matter that much. Also, in Kubernetes, "secrets" can be passed as read-only files.

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  • [–] 10 points 3 years ago

    If you run a binary written with bad intentions, you're doomed anyway.

    This is the security model we have currently.

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  • [–] 7 points 3 years ago*

    CRED=$(fancy-get-cred) do-stuff

    do-stuff has ${CRED} but nothing else does. wrap in a shell script.

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  • [–] 5 points 3 years ago

    What's the goal?

    There are extra steps you can take to try to improve the security against malware, but using environment variables instead of hard coding isn't really intended for that, I don't think.

    It's just to stop accidental leaks with stuff like git and other code sharing.

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  • [–] 5 points 3 years ago

    Global credentials are yuck

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  • [–] 5 points 3 years ago (1 child)

    CyberArk is a commercial product that attacks this problem space. It puts an agent process on the host next to your app. Only processes whose fingerprint matches those authorized to access a credential are allowed to fetch it. That fingerprint can be based on the host (known list of production hosts), the os user ID that owns the pid, the path to the executable for the pid, and probably a few more items.

    Under that model your app just needs to know the environment that it wants (inject however you want) and the userid it wants to use. At runtime it reaches out to the local cyberark agent to obtain the password secret.

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  • [–] 6 points 3 years ago (1 child)

    Under this model, a proprietary, closed source process can access all your secrets.

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  • [–] 1 point 3 years ago* (1 child)

    great point...is there an open source equivalent?

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