367
Spyware maker LetMeSpy shuts down after hacker deletes server data (techcrunch.com)
submitted 3 years ago by to c/technology@lemmy.world
20 comments fedilink hide all child comments
 

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.zip/post/1088852

Archived version: https://archive.ph/cR91h
Archived version: https://ghostarchive.org/archive/F2HRY

you are viewing a single comment's thread
view the rest of the comments
[–] 76 points 3 years ago (1 child)

Nice, another bunch of assholes out of business. Just one question: why the fk did they not have backups? They weren’t just wee little hateful bastards but stoopid on top too?

  • permalink
  • fedilink
  • source
  • hideshow 2 child comments
    •
  • [–] 42 points 3 years ago* (3 children)

    As someone who deals with this sort of thing, for ransomware and other destructive intrusions, the first thing they go for is the backups themselves.

    Companies that have an second backup copy that is seperate somehow so non-lateral movement isn't possible are the ones that survive this level of breach.

    Or they could just be stupid (cheap) and didn't have any lol

  • permalink
  • fedilink
  • source
  • parent
  • hideshow 6 child comments
    •
  • [–] 4 points 3 years ago* (last edited 3 years ago) (1 child)

    Often the server needs access to make backups, so when you get in and get root, you sometimes also have access to delete the backups.

    It depends on how it's set up. If the server pushes the backups somewhere else and has write access, then the hacker can delete them. But if another account logs in to the server and makes a backup and downloads it, it's impossible for the hacker to access the backup.

    Depends on if you planned for the scenario or not.

  • permalink
  • fedilink
  • source
  • parent
  • hideshow 2 child comments
    •
  • [–] 8 points 3 years ago (1 child)

    Part of a good backup solution involves ensuring that it's literally impossible for the "root" / "administrator" whatever user on the production system to delete the backups. For instance, were this AWS, it would be done by creating a separate AWS account and use IAM roles to provide access to a S3 bucket with the "DeleteObject" permission explicitly denied. Perhaps, even deny everything except something like PutObject, and ensure the target S3 bucket is versioned, so even overwriting the contents with garbage is recovered by restoring a previous version.

    But most businesses don't think like that.

  • permalink
  • fedilink
  • source
  • parent
  • hideshow 2 child comments
    •