He is quoted by RIA Novosti and Interfax here, therefore pretty reliable that he actually said it. The fact that he said anything at all is itself very, very telling. Here's why:

  1. It acknowledges the pressure that is being created by Crimea's isolation. By extension, this says volumes about both the Ukrainian army's momentum and capabilities and also the limits and impotence of the Russians.

  2. It shows an urgency and desperation that holding Crimea is still very important to them. But in acknowledging the crisis, it also implies that 'we are working on it'. Meaning - a solution isn't imminent. In a sense - it asks for patience.

  3. Critically - They don't know what to do. If they did - this being a matter of logisitics, supply and tactical air defense - they would have simply done it, and wouldn't need empty platitudes directly from the president about unspecified "solutions".

  4. It shows the situation cannot be ignored anymore and that a statement from the Tsar was necessary. Remember - this is a regime that didn't bother to make presidential statements when they were rolled back significantly in Kharkiv, Kherson counteroffensives, or when their sovreign territory was literally invaded in Kursk. They didnt even acknowledge losing their AWACS fleet, losing 1/3 of their strategic bombers in Operation Spiderweb. He didn't say anything to acknowledge the threat of the Wagner mutiny. He doesn't even make statement when Moscow itself is bombed. But losing control of Crimea is a completely differnt class of crisis to what's come before. Everything else has been survivable. Losing Crimea wouldn't be.

  5. For all the talk of him being misinformed and kept in the dark - this statement suggests he is very aware of the situation and the criticality of saying it. I've never believed the "he's not being told the truth" garbage. This entire stupid project is his personal legacy. He is deply invested and the success of the war is not something he would delegate to the deliberately limited sycophants and not pay very close attention to. Everyday statement from him are made about "the war is going according to plan", "We are advancing in all directions", "we will prevail" nonsense. He almost never, ever makes specific statements about specific challenges or failures on any front. This is what makes this statement acknowleding Crimean difficulties interesting. He acknowledges it, because he must. Or someone with some influence over him has convinced him that he had to.

  6. One of their responses has been to activate the "Good Tsar, Bad Boyars" Repeaters again. Forget Peskov - he's just a mannequin facing the world obtusely, saying nothing. Lavrov is a troll fool with thick skin cosplaying as a diplomat. The real Krelin spokemen for internal messaging and narrative testing are a different type. You've seen them, wondered who they are and where they come from. The come, say the same things for a while, then go, and new ones appear. Here's what I mean:

In Russia, some Z-Bloggers are permitted to speak very freely about how the nature of the problem isn't the invasion itself - the problem is russia is being too gentle. That they should unleash tactical nukes to assert their greatness and hasten their inevitable victory, because....Russia Stronk. They portray themselves as having inside knowlege, above average intellect, well spoken, yet Russian "Everyman" types who seem to know more than a private citizen should know. They have strong opinions about the macro strategic goals, but also the micro level experience of Russian individuals at the same time. And they also have a rare freedom to criticize the prosecution of the war that gets others arrested. Why is this tolerated? Pretty rare combination of skills and, maybe even courage? They don't hide their identities or locations - in fact, they speak specifically about who they are, where they're from. Well...it's not courage. And here's why. It's because they're intelligence agents, with a purpose, acting in a role called a Repeater that broadcasts a signal.

In the early days, it was separatist leader Strelkov who played this role, til he went too far criticizing Putin personally. Or maybe his message started to lose it's resonance. At any rate - this role has been taken over by a bearded nut named Evgeny Golman who pops up in different places, but usually releasing unhinged shouted messages from his car. He rants and raves about the failures in the invasion, the economy, the impacts to civilians, repeats his patriotic hatred of Ukrainans, and of course says that the problem isn't the war itself, it's that Russia is being too nice about things. They should progress to nukes, logically, because Russia is so awesome and victory is inevitable. Their audience is the russian thinking man, to be the voice of a more objective realistic view of things. The script, repeated over and over is the same under Golman as it was under Girkin.

Why are they allowed to say such things? Because they are following orders, and playing the role of the fervent nationalist who speaks for another crowd in a "FINALLY, someone said it" sort of role. Classic "Good Tsar, Bad Boyars" - that the president is being misled by corrupt and ineffective administrators. Shift the blame for failures away from the leader and onto faceless, nameless traitors inside the regime. This tactic has been used for centuries in time of crisis in Russia.

Repeaters serve another purpose. Since they are FSB agents, you can be very sure that the intelligence services pay close attention to who is listening to their messasge. Who likes it, who subscribes, who views, who reaches out to engage, who reposts their content. That is a more intelligent, more capable and more dangerous group of people to keep your eye on. In short - it gets a message out, tests the narrative, and gathers an audience of possibly-wavering doubters to keep a digital eye on. It's a trap to flush out potential conspirators among a more capable audience.

But back to Crimea - the fact he personally had to make a statement suggests this is a big problem and they don't know what to do about it. This is what the start of an accelerating process of a loss of control over a territory looks like.

Wonder how efficient the grain harvest is going to be this year with the price and general shortage of diesel. There's a saying that society is a couple missed paycheques away from anarchy. If the harvest fails and grain rots in the field, things will spiral quickly. Russian morons who 'aren't interested in politics' aren't coping well with the inconvenience of summertime fuel shortages will develop sharper opinions if they have to deal with this on an permanent basis. Their disbelief about fuel queues will progress to much more uncontrollable panic if they literally see countrymen start to starve and become refugees flooding into the cities. The average russian has very little empathy for anything outside of the 1 square foot of land they're standing on. But they are being now touched by the consequences of the war being fought in their name.

It's early days of this new phase of Russian Shortage, and the irreversible effects of an absolute energy crunch are going to be felt for years, even if the figthing stopped today. We may be on the cusp of a cascading worsening of everything that relies on logistics, and maybe even a series of total disasters and even an actual famine in parts of Russia during 2027 that can't be concealed. China and probably the Trump admin will be sending food aid to Russia within a year if they can't harvest their own. India is already sending fuel and asking Ukraine, nicely, not to destroy those imports in transit on humanitarian grounds.

One presidential statement is not the endgame. But the fact he had to acknowledge it at all is a MASSIVE signal that control of the entire project is slipping away from the Kremlin's grasp. And that their negotiating position, if one even exists, is getting worse.

What do you think? Let's have a chin wag.

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[–] 15 points 2 weeks ago (1 child)

I think that if it was simply a question of military resources being applied to the problem, you'd be right. But this entire war is essentially the pet project of one man: Vladimir Putin. If he's ever ousted from power, or dies (of natural causes or falling out of a window), the war will simply end, with Russia returning Crimea, Donetsk, and Luhansk back to Ukraine. Whoever takes on a leadership role afterwards will have one hell of a mess on their hands, and wrapping it all up neatly by placing the blame on Putin will be the best way forward. "You lost your brothers, sons, fathers, husbands? It was all Putin's fault. We tanked our entire economy and global standing and gained absolutely nothing for it? Putin did it."

This is why Ukraine's so insistent on sending drones into Moscow, the most heavily guarded place in all of Russia. They want to spur the people into action. Degrade the standard of living for the elite enough, and they'll take action against the guy who got them into that mess.

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  • [–] [S] 3 points 2 weeks ago* (1 child)

    hink that if it was simply a question of military resources being applied to the problem, you’d be right. But this entire war is essentially the pet project of one man: Vladimir Putin. If he’s ever ousted from power, or dies (of natural causes or falling out of a window), the war will simply end, with Russia returning Crimea, Donetsk, and Luhansk back to Ukraine. Whoever takes on a leadership role afterwards will have one hell of a mess on their hands, and wrapping it all up neatly by placing the blame on Putin will be the best way forward. “You lost your brothers, sons, fathers, husbands? It was all Putin’s fault. We tanked our entire economy and global standing and gained absolutely nothing for it? Putin did it.”

    I tend to agree with you. Just like with post Nicholas II, Stalin, Kruschev, Gorbachev, Yeltsin - every time there is a leadership change in this brittle clown show of a society Russia has created, there is chaos following the transition and the last guy gets blamed for everything. And I agree that the occupied territories will end up returning to Ukrainian control, but not all at once and not all in the same way. Ukraine has options - they don't have to roll their limited supply of hardware and men into Kherson, Zaporhizia, Donetsk, Luhansk and Crimea. They just need to make the Russians leave, and offer a more secure option for those territories than remaining part of a collapsing Russian mafia state. Over time, the most damage Russia will do is to itself. Ukraine will have pushed the snowball down the mountainside that causes the avalanche but they probably will observe it from a distance while they focus on rebuilding their new, permanently altered and European aligned society. They'll probably have a similar experience to Czech, Poland, Romania and Bulgaria's post-Soviet one - relative prosperity, genrally stable democracy, institutional strengthening, but low birth rates adjusting to a new, but hopeful, baseline.

    But i have next to zero faith that any organized opposition will emerge in Russia. It doesn't exist and isn't likely to form spontaneously. What seems more likely is a pure collapse - something more like 1991 than 1917. No more money, empty shelves, spiraling hyperinflation, serfs in bread lines standing around waiting for political change, but not doing anything in particular to make it happen. That means more of a warlord faction type power struggle post-Putin. Ethno-corporate warlords that offer any kind of local stability. Inevitably, they will fight each other, and that process will take years or decades, and god knows what sort of configuration the RF will go through before it's done. Frankly, I see the Russian Empire in a long term phases of collapse, but in terms of centuries, not years. Kind of like how the Ottoman empire collapsed over 300 years, after degrading quality of leadership, losses in war, losing it's best colonies on it's western borders, before ultimately collapsing into a secular rump state of ethnic nationalists like you have in Turkey today. Picture a Russian heartland from St. Petersburg to Rostov north to south, and from Belgorod to maybe Perm in the east. Everything else might fall away into new balkanized countries that will immediately go at each other's throats like Armenia & Azerbaijan over unreconciled territorial claims and feuding for resource control.

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  • [–] 1 point 2 weeks ago

    Yeah - the big problem with Putin being so paranoid and capable is that anybody who could have posed a serious threat to his leadership has already been cut from the herd and rendered harmless. He had a great teacher in Stalin as far as that's concerned. There are a couple of exceptions I could see taking the reins, however (sorry for the novel).

    Andrey Belousov seems like an unlikely candidate, seeing as how he's an economist and an academic, but it might be precisely because he seems so unthreatening that he's been given extraordinary power within the federation. He became Putin's presidential aide for economic affairs in 2013, and was a key figure behind Russia's decision to annex Crimea in 2014. He was then appointed to be the first deputy prime minister in 2020 (and became acting prime minister while Mikhail Mishustin came down with COVID). Then in 2024, after Shoigu fell out of Putin's grace following the Prigozhin rebellion, he was appointed to be the minister of defense. He made several hard-line statements since then, including that Russia should prepare for war with NATO, that Russia should resume nuclear testing, and that Russia should conquer Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia as well; so that should endear him to the hawks in the country. Crucially, though, he's also on record as saying that he's always been guided by the principle that "you can make mistakes, but you cannot lie". I think he's smart enough to read the writing on the wall, and shrewd enough to take power and then pin the entire mess on Putin.

    Another option I could see is Alexander Bortnikov. He's the director of the FSB, and has been since 2008. Before that, he was KGB for 28 years. He, reportedly, was a key figure in Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022 - apparently, he was the one who convinced Putin that Ukrainians would celebrate the Russians as liberators, and would open the path to Kyiv for them. Like Belousov, he's made several very hawkish public comments about Russia's war, but has also somehow generated a reputation for honesty. I have no idea how a man who's spent half of his adult life in either the KGB or FSB can come across as honest, but that's how Russians see him. According to Lukashenko, Bortnikov was one of the negotiators who got Prigozhin to stand down after his rebellion. I think that Bortnikov is... not very good at his job, but is shrewd enough to make people think he is. I think he's also got the chops to appeal to the hawks in the country, and the duplicity to blame it all on Putin when things go sideways. Main issue is that he's 74. That might actually work in his favor, though, as the other back stabbers around him would see propping up a man who's probably going to die in a few years as a key career move.

    There are a few other people who come to mind as well, like Shoigu and Volodin, but if there's a coup, I'm betting money on the two people above.

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