▲ 310 ▼ Report: White House delaying release of voting machine security study (www.reuters.com) submitted 1 month ago* (last edited 1 month ago) by sanitation@lemmy.today to c/technology@lemmy.world 46 comments fedilink hide all child comments
[+] thepig@lemmy.zip 12 points 1 month ago* (last edited 4 weeks ago) (2 children) [removed by mod] permalink fedilink source parent hideshow 4 child comments replies: [–] Humanius@lemmy.world 10 points 1 month ago (1 child) In the Netherlands we had switched to electronic voting in the past, but we switched back to paper after some very serious security flaws were pointed out. These days there is some discussion on whether electronic counting of paper ballots should be allowed, but at least there is still a paper trail in that case and you could hypothetically double check everything by hand. permalink fedilink source parent hideshow 2 child comments replies: [+] thepig@lemmy.zip 8 points 1 month ago* (last edited 4 weeks ago) (1 child) [removed by mod] permalink fedilink source parent hideshow 2 child comments replies: [–] Humanius@lemmy.world 4 points 1 month ago* (last edited 1 month ago) I think using electronic counting (of paper ballots) can be an acceptable way to speed up how soon we get to know what the result will likely be after the polls close. But it is important that there always happens a manual count, and that that manual count should ultimately be the answer we trust. permalink fedilink source parent [–] 4am@lemmy.zip 3 points 1 month ago (2 children) If you think vote counting is conplex, just wait until you hear about embedded microcontrollers permalink fedilink source parent hideshow 4 child comments replies: [–] fushuan@piefed.blahaj.zone 1 point 1 month ago Nothing alike. Voting is a trust issue, and while we have several trust based systems, it's very hard to implement a system where even if the users don't trust the system itself they can trust the result it produces. That's the issue with electronic voting, trust that is placed in manual vote counting volunteers supervised by representatives of every party is small, because you only need to trust that each box was counted correctly. When you aggregate all those small trusts into a singular system, which even if divided in machines, is still a singular entity, then it's impossible to trust the centralised system enough, and it must be incredibly robust to prove to every individual that their vote was cast correctly. I proposed a system like that in my last comment, but I still wouldn't trust such a system simply because the risk someone phishing the machines on voting day is so high, even if it has close to zero probability, that we can't risk it. permalink fedilink source parent [+] thepig@lemmy.zip 1 point 1 month ago* (last edited 4 weeks ago) [removed by mod] permalink fedilink source parent
[–] Humanius@lemmy.world 10 points 1 month ago (1 child) In the Netherlands we had switched to electronic voting in the past, but we switched back to paper after some very serious security flaws were pointed out. These days there is some discussion on whether electronic counting of paper ballots should be allowed, but at least there is still a paper trail in that case and you could hypothetically double check everything by hand. permalink fedilink source parent hideshow 2 child comments replies: [+] thepig@lemmy.zip 8 points 1 month ago* (last edited 4 weeks ago) (1 child) [removed by mod] permalink fedilink source parent hideshow 2 child comments replies: [–] Humanius@lemmy.world 4 points 1 month ago* (last edited 1 month ago) I think using electronic counting (of paper ballots) can be an acceptable way to speed up how soon we get to know what the result will likely be after the polls close. But it is important that there always happens a manual count, and that that manual count should ultimately be the answer we trust. permalink fedilink source parent
[+] thepig@lemmy.zip 8 points 1 month ago* (last edited 4 weeks ago) (1 child) [removed by mod] permalink fedilink source parent hideshow 2 child comments replies: [–] Humanius@lemmy.world 4 points 1 month ago* (last edited 1 month ago) I think using electronic counting (of paper ballots) can be an acceptable way to speed up how soon we get to know what the result will likely be after the polls close. But it is important that there always happens a manual count, and that that manual count should ultimately be the answer we trust. permalink fedilink source parent
[–] Humanius@lemmy.world 4 points 1 month ago* (last edited 1 month ago) I think using electronic counting (of paper ballots) can be an acceptable way to speed up how soon we get to know what the result will likely be after the polls close. But it is important that there always happens a manual count, and that that manual count should ultimately be the answer we trust. permalink fedilink source parent
[–] 4am@lemmy.zip 3 points 1 month ago (2 children) If you think vote counting is conplex, just wait until you hear about embedded microcontrollers permalink fedilink source parent hideshow 4 child comments replies: [–] fushuan@piefed.blahaj.zone 1 point 1 month ago Nothing alike. Voting is a trust issue, and while we have several trust based systems, it's very hard to implement a system where even if the users don't trust the system itself they can trust the result it produces. That's the issue with electronic voting, trust that is placed in manual vote counting volunteers supervised by representatives of every party is small, because you only need to trust that each box was counted correctly. When you aggregate all those small trusts into a singular system, which even if divided in machines, is still a singular entity, then it's impossible to trust the centralised system enough, and it must be incredibly robust to prove to every individual that their vote was cast correctly. I proposed a system like that in my last comment, but I still wouldn't trust such a system simply because the risk someone phishing the machines on voting day is so high, even if it has close to zero probability, that we can't risk it. permalink fedilink source parent [+] thepig@lemmy.zip 1 point 1 month ago* (last edited 4 weeks ago) [removed by mod] permalink fedilink source parent
[–] fushuan@piefed.blahaj.zone 1 point 1 month ago Nothing alike. Voting is a trust issue, and while we have several trust based systems, it's very hard to implement a system where even if the users don't trust the system itself they can trust the result it produces. That's the issue with electronic voting, trust that is placed in manual vote counting volunteers supervised by representatives of every party is small, because you only need to trust that each box was counted correctly. When you aggregate all those small trusts into a singular system, which even if divided in machines, is still a singular entity, then it's impossible to trust the centralised system enough, and it must be incredibly robust to prove to every individual that their vote was cast correctly. I proposed a system like that in my last comment, but I still wouldn't trust such a system simply because the risk someone phishing the machines on voting day is so high, even if it has close to zero probability, that we can't risk it. permalink fedilink source parent
[+] thepig@lemmy.zip 1 point 1 month ago* (last edited 4 weeks ago) [removed by mod] permalink fedilink source parent